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ABSTRACT
MAKING THE CASE FOR PLACE: AN EXPLORATION OF URBANIZATION
MEASURES ON A MODEL OF SOCIAL CAPITAL AND U.K. CRIME RATES
Kyshawn K. Smith
Old Dominion University, 2016
Director: Dr. Ruth A. Triplett

Studies of social capital and crime have become quite
popular in recent history, and a plethora of empirical tests
have sought to clarify relationships between the two variables.
However, most of these studies center on communities in the
United States, and often overlook the many differentiating
features between urban and rural communities that would affect
such models.

Reasons offered for such skew in the past and

current research on this subject are middling at best, and
largely cite either a lack of availability in data for crime and
social capital in non-urban communities, or questionable
accuracy for what data is accessible.
This dissertation sought to address both the lack of
research on social capital effects on crime rates in communities
outside of the U.S., and the lack of consideration of
urbanization level in such research.

Hypotheses derived under

these general goals were tested using a combination of
multivariate regression analyses and structural equation
modeling on datasets provided by the Office of National
Statistics (U.K.) and the British Social Attitudes Survey.

!
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Findings revealed social capital and crime models vary
between urban and rural communities.

It was also revealed that

models of social capital and crime are contingent upon crime
type and urbanization level.
Conclusions and implications from this research suggested
social capital is relevant in social capital-crime discourse in
the U.K., but not always in the ways that current literature
suggests it would be.

Additionally, it was clear that greater

specificity in social capital-crime models in the U.K. is
warranted as the data revealed such models are only relevant for
a limited combination of crime and community types.

Future

research should expand towards clarifying the relationship
between social capital and crime rates in rural U.K. areas,
incorporate more definitions of social capital driven by the
idiosyncratic features of urban and rural communities, and
consider more exploration of these models in countries typically
underrepresented in the literature.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
In the social sciences, residential neighborhoods have long

held a distinct significance as key domains for organizing and
understanding social life.

Since the latter 19th century, of

particular interest for social scientists has been the
connection between structural mechanisms in residential
neighborhoods, the ecological processes of life in such
communities, and crime.

Scholars interested in explaining crime

in these neighborhoods have turned to a number of theoretical
concepts, with social disorganization, collective efficacy and
social capital prominent among them.

Recent work has sparked a

keen interest in social capital and an increasing number of
studies consider the role of social capital in crime.
Though definitions vary, social capital is generally
thought to be the commodity comprised of relationships and
behavioral norms rooted in social cohesion between individuals
and/or institutions.

It allows access to certain valued

benefits (e.g., poverty relief, employment opportunities, family
stability) and the attainment of goals often unreachable through
alternative means (Coleman 1988; Coleman 1990; Halpern 2005;
Neal 2011; Portes 1998; Putnam 2000; Woolcock 2010).

It

encompasses an array of qualities like trust, reciprocity,
volunteerism, and civic engagement between individuals within a
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collective (e.g., residents in a neighborhood, inmates in a
prison, students within a school).

The last 30 years of

ecological studies in the social sciences have been especially
fruitful in framing the current sentiment that areas high in
social capital are advantaged in a number of ways.
Seminal research from Robert Putnam revealed how traditions
of civic engagement – a vital correlate of social capital –
facilitated democracy in Italy and the U.S. alike (Putnam 2000;
Putnam, Leonardi, and Nanetti 1993). In East Asia, social
capital has been shown to partially explain economic growth,
while lower levels have marked the downfall of former Soviet
republics (Portes and Landholt 1996).

Miles (2012) observed the

benefits of urban ecological designs in certain communities of
Istanbul, where social capital exchanges are heavily promoted,
and concluded similar planning could benefit urban communities
in his native Australia.
One rationale for the positive gains resulting from social
capital is that the bonds of cohesion formed under social
capital decrease social transaction costs in a community.
in turn, allows for more peaceful conflict resolutions.

This,
Another

cited advantage of social capital is the enhancement of social
bonds between community members.

In turn, this leads to a

suppression of the “free-rider problem” of collective action –
individuals receiving the benefits of collective action without
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contributing to its establishment or maintenance (Lederman,
Loayza, and Menendez 2001).
In recent criminological literature, there has been
considerable focus in neighborhood research on the absence of
social capital, its components and the related concept of
collective efficacy.

By and large, this literature has shown

the absence of these commodities leads to more crime.
Specifically, communities with higher social capital generally
possess stronger social networks and support.

These enhance

overall well-being via neighborhood satisfaction and high
collective efficacy among those incorporated into the
neighborhood and said networks (Ferguson 2007).

In such highly

supportive communities, residents are more inclined to adopt
both formal and informal measures to preserve their safety and
those close to them, which in a high social capital community
often accounts for an extensive matrix of individuals.
Conversely, communities low in social capital typically lack
these networks and the associated capacity to prevent harm from
criminal and otherwise deviant activity.
It is worth noting that social capital is not conceptually
tied to any particular type of neighborhood or geographic place;
it is arguably found in all types of communities across the
globe where people reside (i.e., urban, suburban, or rural).
Yet, much of the prevailing literature on social capital and its
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effects in residential communities is limited by an almost
exclusive development and testing in Western industrialized
nations (particularly the United States) and urban areas.
Woolcock (2001), for example, noted how social capital has
tended to be exported wholesale from Western settings with
little regard for the relevance of cultural context in its
conceptualization:
All ideas are grounded in language and history, and for
whatever reason, we find ourselves living at a time when
most of the best social science departments in the most
prestigious (and well-funded) universities happen to reside
in the Western world. For better or worse, “social capital”
is an idea that has emerged from this milieu…(Woolcock
2001:17)
As the social capital discourse outside of traditional
Western settings has lagged, questions have emerged about the
generalizability of the concept and theories derived from it.
Similar concerns have been raised about research on neighborhood
crime in general.

As renowned criminologist Robert Sampson

(2008) once remarked concerning the overall state of community
crime discourse:
A third concern I have about extant community research is
its seeming disregard for the establishment of generality
in causal mechanisms. The prime example is that most of
our knowledge has been gained from U.S. cities and only a
few of them at that…our comparative knowledge base is,
unfortunately, limited – very few multi-level studies have
been carried out with the explicit goal of cross-national
comparison of crime rates and community social mechanisms.
(Sampson 2008:161)
Aside from recognition of the limited exploration of social
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capital and neighborhood crime respectively outside the U.S.,
most research into these matters is done in urban areas.

A

number of scholars have voiced concern over this problem in
studies of crime (Cancino 2003; Cancino 2005; DeKeseredy,
Donnermeyer, Schwartz, Tunnell, and Hall 2007; Osgood and
Chambers 2000; Petee and Kowalski 1993; Reisig and Cancino 2004;
Sampson 2008). They argue that in the U.S., two enduring
perceptions are related to the lack of attention given by
criminologists to non-urban areas.
The first is that crime is not common outside of large
cities (Weisheit and Donnermeyer 2000; Weisheit, Falcone, and
Wells 2006).

Accordingly, crime in rural areas has often been

thought to be more predictable, easier to explain, and thus less
urgently in need of explanation (Weisheit, Falcone, and Wells
2006). The second is that the crime that does occur is
fundamentally incongruent with the seminal ecological theories
of community crime.
Alternatively, Laub (1983) argued that the extent of
urbanization is an important determinant of criminality despite
receiving comparatively little attention in empirical work.

He

also added that theories of crime originally developed and
tested in urban areas are just as applicable to rural settings.
His argument is that the supposed differences between
metropolitan and nonmetropolitan neighborhoods have waned
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substantially since the genesis of early ecological crime
theories (Osgood and Chambers 2000; Petee and Kowalski 1993).
Thus, if patterns of urban and rural crime were shown to be
similar (even when the respective crime levels vary between
urban and rural neighborhoods), then those theories originally
formulated in urban research could and should still apply to
rural settings (Laub 1983).
Ecological crime studies in countries outside of the U.S.
(i.e., those comprising the United Kingdom) reveal similar
skewing towards urban neighborhoods.

This may be the result of

heightened difficulty noted in obtaining data from non-urban
communities overseas.

For instance, Ashby and Longley (2005)

observed that suburban and rural neighborhoods in the U.K. tend
to be geographically wider and less densely populated than urban
communities.

Thus, these communities are harder to cover for

law enforcement officials and report fewer incidents of crime
for formal authorities to respond to.
Lack of police coverage and breadth of crime data obtainable
for research are inextricably linked in the U.K.

This is

because in the U.K. crime data often originates at the local
authority level – a popular geographic standard for defining
territories and studying communities throughout the U.K. These
definitions are predicated on the extent of police coverage
available in communities throughout each of the U.K.’s four
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countries. As data volume and reporting accuracy have
traditionally suffered in less urban areas, data collection
agencies and researchers alike have been less inclined to pay
attention to these communities.
Advancements in data coverage and sophistication in recent
history have reduced some of these concerns about non-urban
communities.

Concurrently, scholars have increasingly begun to

acknowledge that crimes common to urban settings do occur in
rural and suburban communities.

While generally less frequent

in comparison to urban criminal activity, there is notable work
highlighting non-urban crime as a significant problem worth
detailed exploration (Kposowa and Breault 1993; Kposowa,
Breault, and Harrison 1995; Osgood and Chambers 2000; Smith and
Huff 1982; Spano and Nagy 2005; Weisheit, Falcone, and Wells
2006).
For instance, illicit use of cocaine, amphetamines, alcohol,
and inhalants are all more common among rural residents, and
rural domestic violence rates are also comparable to urban areas
(Websdale 1995; Weisheit, Falcone, and Wells 2006).

Gangs and

gang-related violence have become increasingly problematic in
smaller, less urbanized communities as well (Bouley and Wells
2001).

A number of studies confirm homicides and other violent

crimes occur in nonmetropolitan neighborhoods at rates similar
to urban neighborhoods when structural forces like poverty,
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marital discord and population change are accounted for (Barnett
and Mencken 2002; Kposowa and Breault 1993; Kposowa, Breault,
and Harrison 1995; Lee, Maume, and Ousey 2003).
Yet, despite such insights, scholarship on crime in less
urbanized settings is still comparatively limited.

This is no

less the case within the literature that considers social
capital’s role in explaining criminal activity.

However, it is

particularly curious that social capital has been so often
overlooked in light of the supporting evidence of social
capital’s general relevance in studies in nonmetropolitan,
foreign settings (Castle 2002; Coleman 1988; Coleman 1990;
Halpern 2005; Hofferth and Iceland 1998).
In light of the narrow international scope and lack of
attention on nonmetropolitan communities where criminological
concerns are forefront, research on social capital and crime in
areas outside of the U.S. that vary in level of urbanization is
clearly warranted.

Therefore, the intent of this study is to

perform such an examination.

Specifically, this study proposes

to gather and analyze data from nationally syndicated sources
covering crime and social attitudes in England and Wales, with
the following questions to be addressed:
- Is social capital the same concept between urban and rural
communities in the U.K.?

Specifically, do traditional

indicators of social capital (friendship bonds, trust, and
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organizational participation) vary significantly in their
levels across rural and urban communities in the U.K.?

- Do structural factors (e.g., poverty, residential stability)
similarly influence crime across both rural and urban areas in
the U.K.?
- To what extent does social capital mediate the effects of
structural characteristics on crime?
The next chapter starts with a brief overview of the history
of social capital scholarship, including the key figures in
social capital theory development and their various
interpretations of the concept.

This section will also

highlight the various definitions, components, and causes of
social capital commonly cited in the literature, along with the
problems resulting from inconsistency in these definitions.

In

an effort to reconcile the divergence in definitions, this
continues by presenting a definition of social capital drawn
from the literature that can be applied to the data available
for this dissertation.

The chapter then proceeds to review two

related concepts drawn from criminology – social disorganization
and collective efficacy – and concludes with a discussion of the
ways in which social capital and crime may vary across rural and
urban areas.

!
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CHAPTER II
SOCIAL CAPITAL, CRIME AND THE URBAN/RURAL DIVIDE
An important area of criminological theory and research

explores why neighborhood crime rates vary.

Both theory

development and testing on this subject stems from work done in
urban communities in Western industrialized nations, and
predominantly those within the U.S.

In this chapter, social

capital – a key concept in some theories of neighborhood crime –
will be examined with particular attention to its history, its
definition, its causes/components and its relationship to
neighborhood crime.

As with neighborhood crime discourse

overall, the discussion in this chapter will show that social
capital’s presence in this discourse is also largely developed
from U.S. scholarship and has been applied mainly to urban
settings.

The chapter will end with a discussion of how it may

or may not apply to crime in rural areas as well.

HISTORY OF SOCIAL CAPITAL
The concept of social capital and theories surrounding it
are traceable to some of the earliest discourse in social
science.

Observations from Emile Durkheim illustrated how

individual anomie and ensuing self-destructive tendencies could
be quelled through developing strong community connections
(Durkheim 1968; Durkheim 2008 (1893)).

!
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application of social capital theory, however, is often credited
to 18th century Progressive reformer Lyda J. Hanifan (Putnam
2000).
Among Hanifan’s main interests was improving educational
opportunities and quality in suburban and rural West Virginia.
Hanifan observed how the best schools and brightest students
were most often situated in communities where residents actively
participated in local school affairs. He believed that effective
educational institutions were an outcome of community
involvement rather than singular efforts, and that individuals
were socially “helpless” if left to survive solely by their own
hand (Hanifan 1916).

Beyond its educational advantages, Hanifan

believed that a host of individual interests were best served
when the good of the community was addressed.

He further argued

that social capital carried the potential for compound earnings
in the form of positive interactions extending beyond the family
household.

The core precepts of his definition of social

capital consisted of goodwill, fellowship, mutual sympathy and
social intercourse (Hanifan 1916:130).
Modern conceptual expansion of social capital can be
partially attributed to renowned French sociologist Pierre
Bourdieu.

For Bourdieu, social capital is “the aggregate of the

actual or potential resources which are linked to possession of
a durable network of more or less institutionalized
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relationships of mutual acquaintance or recognition” (Bourdieu
1985:248).

He understood social capital as both the connections

between social actors that provide mutually beneficial
resources, and the quality of these resources.

Bourdieu also

believed that the resources “which accrue from membership in a
group are the basis of the solidarity which makes them possible”
(Bourdieu 1985:249).

Consider for example the kinship between

members of a neighborhood civic league.

Such kinship is

grounded in and strengthened by the availability of resources
made possible through the connections formed between league
members.

An example would be awareness of lucrative employment

opportunities, where such awareness is acquired initially
through interactions with fellow league members.
American economist Glen Loury (1976, 1981) made an indelible
mark of his own on social capital theory by way of his research
on race-based income inequality.

Sparked by a belief that

traditional economic theories were unable to explain America’s
racial divide in income categories, Loury turned to social
capital.

Early on, he defined social capital mainly as

intergenerational mobility and strength of inheritance.
Embedded within this work is the observation that AfricanAmericans experiencing poverty and disenfranchisement have
traditionally been deficient in the qualities that comprise
social capital.

!
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linkages or “bridges” to resources in social settings normally
inaccessible to African American audiences; such bridges provide
crucial knowledge of and access to employment opportunities
(Fernandez and Fernandez-Mateo 2008).

In A Dynamic Theory of

Racial Income Differences (Loury 1976; Portes 1998), Loury cites
differential access to social connections for minorities and
nonminority youth as a critical component to how racialized
income inequality functions.
While not exclusively a scholar in social capital, Loury
would expound upon the subject in later years.

In a 1985 issue

of Black Enterprise magazine, he defined social capital as the
set of social institutions that inhere in family relations and
community social organizations, and are useful in generating
economic benefits by affecting the cognitive and social
development of individual actors in a given social setting
(Loury 1985).

These resources can constitute an important

advantage for children and adolescents in the development of
their human capital, and thus improve employment prospects and
wage-earning potential.
Under Loury’s (1985) perspective, social capital is also
considered to be those social relationships that come into
existence when individuals attempt to make the best use of their
personal resources. He has argued these resources need not be
seen solely as components of social structure, but also as
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resources for the individual within said structure.

As a

precursor to more recent social capital scholarship, Loury’s
contributions were particularly influential to one of the most
prominent voices on social capital in recent history: American
sociologist James Coleman.
In Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital (Coleman
1988) and Foundations of Social Theory (Coleman 1990), Coleman
sought to expand upon Loury’s original work by arguing that
social capital is a multidimensional concept. In Coleman’s
perspective, social capital exists in three basic forms.

The

first is the combination of established obligations,
expectations, and trustworthiness.

Collectively, these are

common source for producing social credits and debts useful in
mobilizing community residents to action.

Second is information

channels; more specifically, social ties capable of producing or
enhancing information and goal attainment. Coleman argued that
the third form of social capital is established norms and
sanctions of behavior supported by neighborhood residents, which
also undergird effective social control (Coleman 1988; Coleman
1990; White 2006). These forms of social capital share the
quality of being linked to social structure and capable of
inciting specific actions from individuals within said structure
(Coleman 1990; Portes 1998). Coleman further emphasized the
importance of closure, or the presence of enough social ties
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between actors to guarantee norm observance, in his
conceptualization of social capital (Coleman 1990).
Widely considered responsible for reaffirming social
capital’s relevance in contemporary social science discourse,
Coleman made an indelible impression upon numerous scholars to
follow.

Arguably the most prominent voice among them is

American social and political philosopher Robert Putnam, whose
description of American civic life drew significant and
widespread attention to the concept of social capital.
As one of the most resonant voices in contemporary social
capital theory today, Putnam defines the concept as the
connections between and across groups of social actors that
facilitate survival and/or advancement within social settings,
along with the norms of generalized trust, reciprocity, and
collective action that arise from such connections (Putnam
2000).

According to Putnam, social capital usually manifests

itself as either social bonds or social bridges.

Bonding social

capital refers to those ties between members of the same social
group that lead to more exclusive connections amongst relatively
homogenous groups such as family members, close friends, and
fraternal/sororal members.
Social bridges, on the other hand, unite individuals from
separate enclaves.

Bridging social capital, therefore, is a

product of the social connections that crosscut internal

!
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networks to connect members of different non-familial groups
(Beyerlein and Hipp 2005; Putnam 2000).

The connections formed

through social capital bridges tend to be weaker than those
found under bonding social capital.

They are more diverse,

however, and conducive towards social advancement or “getting
ahead” – a la Granovetter’s “weak ties” thesis (Granovetter
1973) – than those formed under bonding social capital. These
tend to be stronger but less accommodating to heterogeneity
between individuals and groups (Beyerlein and Hipp 2005).
Putnam, Leonardi, and Nanetti’s (1993) earliest research
into the civic traditions of residential communities in Italy
and their impact on the effectiveness of democracy is considered
a benchmark in social capital theory development.

In that

research, they concluded that those communities most
demonstrative of the democratic ethos were also the ones most
populated with citizens high in social capital.

Here, social

capital was represented via higher frequencies of meaningful
social interactions, shared norms, and networks useful in
resolving conflicts.

It is a position he would revisit several

times more in subsequent analyses, of which the most prominent
is his turn-of-the-century opus on the status of civic life in
America, Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American
Community (Putnam 2000).
Bowling Alone synthesized Putnam’s hypothesis that the
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stability of residential community life in America has suffered
on numerous fronts due to declines in social capital.

Marked

decreases in voter participation, activity in professional
organizations, volunteerism, social trust, altruism, and
religious activity stand prominent among the supporting evidence
he offered.

Putnam also remarked in subsequent analysis that

social capital does vary with wealth and prosperity.

Poorer

communities found in predominantly urban settings are
disproportionately more deficient in social capital.

He also

argued that as a result there are negative outcomes like crime
and violence.
Putnam’s suppositions have sparked considerable debate and
criticism.

Particularly contested has been his interpretation

of Alexis de Tocqueville’s Democracy in America, a seminal piece
of observational literature undergirding the main hypotheses
expounded in Bowling Alone.

DeFilippis (2001) argued Putnam

erroneously diminishes the complexity of de Tocqueville’s
original thesis by conflating civil society with social capital
on the grounds that social capital is comprised of the norms and
networks of civil society that lubricate cooperative action
among both citizens and their institutions.

DeFilippis (2001)

also maintained Putnam narrowly presents social capital as a
primarily positive concept enabling people to act towards mutual
goals fostered through trust and shared norms.

!

It is true,
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according to DeFilippis (2001), that the propensity of Americans
to develop trust networks and volunteer their time to support
civic leagues and other local social organizations was a staple
of America’s culture at the time of de Tocqueville’s analysis.
de Tocqueville also believed, however, that civil society was
only one of a number of factors defining America’s democratic
and social identity – a controversial one at that.

Thus,

isolating it as Putnam does for the sake of supporting his
stance on social capital is perceived by DeFilippis and fellow
scholars as highly selective and myopic (DeFilippis 2001; Foley
and Edwards 1997).
Moreover, Putnam is said to adhere to a somewhat antiquated,
oversimplified notion of organizational participation wherein it
is thought that people voluntarily join associations mainly to
pursue common objectives.

DeFilippis argues that this notion

enables Putnam to compare in equal light everything from trade
unions to PTAs to bowling leagues when discussing where social
capital stems from and why it is dropping (DeFilippis 2001).
Here again, an important objection garners some attention.
In the advent of major societal changes across the U.S.
wrought by Industrialism and Post-Industrialism (e.g., greater
complexity in social classes, disparities in income and
institutional power), present-day voluntary associations are not
nearly so homogenous in the goals of their members nor in their
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effect on communities as to justify conceptualizing them all
together (DeFilippis 2001).

Instead, DeFilippis (2001) states

that access to social capital and related benefits members may
reap are differentially skewed towards those organizations and
networks higher in social status and/or wielding greater power
(i.e., access to resources deemed vital for the organization’s
existence).

While quick to identify the importance of voluntary

associations and activity in the formulation of social capital,
DeFilippis (2001) argues that Putnam offers far less insight
into the influence of class and power in the existence of such
organizations.
Other criticisms levied against Putnam’s assessment of
social capital in America include a lack of consideration for
alternative forms of networking and civic engagement (DeFilippis
2001; Portes 1998; Portes and Landholt 1996).

Putnam has been

cited for adhering to a biased view that economically depressed,
inner-city neighborhoods are deficient in producing social
capital (DeFilippis 2001; Portes 1998; Portes and Landholt
1996).

He is also cited for failing to account for a number of

idiosyncrasies in relationship development and interaction that
– while not necessarily captured under his definition of social
capital – are nonetheless illustrative of the concept
(DeFilippis 2001).

Ethnographic research from Elijah Anderson

(2007 (1994)) supports the notion that, rather than an outright
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lack of social capital, relationships amongst residents in
impoverished ghetto neighborhoods result in forms of social
capital not easily measured by self-reports of trust or
participation in voluntary social organizations.
The critiques of social capital stemming from such work as
Putnam’s can be delineated into three broad areas. First, the
concept “social capital” is defined differently across different
theorists.

As demonstrated from the earliest origins with

Hanifan, each of the preeminent scholars of the concept offers a
unique perspective.

While some theorists define social capital

as the process of developing resources into social ties, others
say it is better understood by the results of such processes.
There are also scholars that would contend it is best
conceptualized as both the process and the results.
Secondly, it is not always easy to identify where social
capital resides and thirdly, nor is it easy to determine its
causes.

While Loury, Bourdieu, and Coleman all concluded social

capital is embedded in relationships, Putnam has staunchly
defined it is a commodity residing in individuals (DeFilippis
2001; Portes 1998; Portes and Landholt 1996).

He has further

argued it is a commodity that can publicly or privately held
(DeFilippis 2001; Putnam 2000).

In some respects, this

conceptual ambiguity has been attributed to a flaw in Coleman’s
initial reintroduction of the term.

!

In that work, social
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capital is simultaneously defined as a mechanism, thing, and/or
an outcome (DeFilippis, 2001; Portes, 1998).

DEFINING SOCIAL CAPITAL AND ITS STRUCTURAL CAUSES
Given the various criticisms of social capital in both
theory and application, it is important before proceeding to
clarify the definition and causes of social capital to be used
in this research.

Similar to Bourdieu’s perspective, the

definition of social capital preferred for this study emphasizes
two elements.

The first is the connections between people.

The

second is the impact of these connections, including the
mutually embraced norms created through such bonds and the
informal sanctions levied against behaviors that threaten to
undermine those bonds (Cancino 2005; Coleman 1990; Halpern 2005;
Putnam 2000).

As with other forms of capital (i.e., human,

financial), this definition also acknowledges social capital can
grow through investment, be spent wisely or carelessly, be
applied to the benefit or detriment of another's cache of
resources, or enhanced when combined with other forms of capital
(Burt 1992).
Several more scholars have recognized that social capital is
difficult to pin down to a single indicator, and thus have
tended to favor definitions that aggregate several known
components (Forrest and Kearns 2001; Grootaert 2006; Lederman,
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Loayza, and Menendez 2001; Research 2000b; Stone 2001).
Noteworthy among such efforts to operationalize social capital
is the Social Capital Community Benchmark, or SCCB (Research,
2000).

This work presents social capital as an amalgamation of

social trust, racial trust, civic participation, friendship
network diversity, group involvement (formal and informal),
faith-based social capital, organized group interactions and
informal social activity.

Easily among the largest recognized

analyses of social capital, few other studies match the SCCB in
breadth of factors tested.

Several subsequent studies confirm

the relevance of factors initially vetted through the SCCB as
benchmark social capital measures (Brown and Ferris 2007; de
Souza Briggs 2007; Subramanian, Kim, and Kawachi 2002; Thoresen
and Harris 2002; Uslaner 1999; Uslaner 2002).
For instance, the World Bank surmised social capital to be
the product of six dimensions – groups/networks,
trust/solidarity, collective action/cooperation,
information/communication, social cohesion/inclusion, and
empowerment/political action (Grootaert, Narayan, Jones, and
Woolcock 2004) – similar to variables presented in the SCCB.
Stone (2001) posited a similar framework of network
characteristics that featured trust norms and reciprocity.
Forrest and Kearns (2001) offered a dynamic layout of social
capital dimensions that included trust, supportive reciprocal

!

!

23

networks, and associational activity towards common purpose.
Across these studies, three key components tend to encompass
social capital above all others: trust, informal friendship
connections, and organizational participation (Cancino 2005;
Grootaert 2006; Messner, Rosenfeld, and Baumer 2004; Rosenfeld,
Messner, and Baumer 2001; Sampson, Morenoff, and Earls 1999;
Stone 2001; Woolcock 2001; Woolcock 2010).

More specifically, a

functional, generalizable definition of social capital
incorporates the informal social connections stemming from local
friendship networks, attitudes such as trust that hold the
networks together, and the resources and action that arise from
the networks (i.e., diverse, structured organizational
activity).
For instance, informal friendship networks and the social
bonds that bind them together hold a significant place in the
traditions of civic life and identity of American communities
(Kasarda and Janowitz 1974; Putnam 2000).

A well-structured

system of friends has long served as a main conduit towards
social capital in the U.S., and data from the Social Capital
Index – a proprietary aggregate measure of social capital
derived by Putnam and his colleagues – reveals that many people
who score high the measure tend to socialize more often with
friends (Putnam 2000).

Bonds between friends tend to endure

across both urban and rural settings, and thus the frequency and
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breadth of visitations with friends stands as a popular measure
of social capital (Putnam 2000).
Concerning criminal activity and deviance on the whole, the
relevance of quality friendship connections is documented in the
seminal literature from Sampson and Groves (1989) on systemic
models of neighborhood crime.

Their research maintains that

informal friendship bonds are the most basic form of social
connections constituting a community’s relationship
infrastructure, and are a key resource for residents in exacting
internal social control over deviance (Sampson and Groves 1989).
Consequently, systemic theories of crime contend that when
residents of a community form strong local ties by way of these
friendship networks, social control within the community is
enhanced. There is an increased capacity to recognize strangers
and create additional structural constraints on deviant behavior
and other sources of predatory victimization (Sampson and Groves
1989).
Building from the original social disorganization model
(Shaw and McKay 1942, 1949), and with important clarification
added by Kasarda and Janowitz (1974) on the significance of
friendship bonds, Sampson and Groves (1989) found friendship
networks had the second largest effect on burglary, and the
extent of friendship ties in a community inversely correlated
with street robbery, burglary, and total victimization.
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Conversely, communities characterized by sparse friendship
networks, along with unsupervised teenage peer groups and low
organizational participation, held disproportionately higher
rates of crime and delinquency in their research (Sampson and
Groves 1989).

In sum, to the extent that residents in a

community develop close friendships with fellow neighbors, they
can be said to possess social capital.
Along with friendship ties, trust is a frequently cited
component of social capital (Cancino 2005; Portes 1998; White
2006).

It is the main attitudinal component of social capital

and regarded by some to be its most predictive factor (Neal
2011).

Trust reduces the transaction costs associated with

volunteerism and minimizes the number of resources required to
ensure alignment between the behavior of individuals and groups
within a community and the community’s best interests (Putnam
2000; Uslaner 1999).

The attention to common interests and

community welfare corresponding with social capital develops
when trust is generalized in such a way as to allow people in a
community to perceive that fellow residents hold values and
behavioral standards similar to their own, and will tend to act
in the community’s best interests (Coleman 1990; Jung 2003;
Putnam, Leonardi, and Nanetti 1993; Vermeij 2007; Wollebek and
Selle 2007).
Finally, there is collective organizational participation –
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a third commonly recognized feature of social capital.

It is

thought that such activity does not flourish if trust is nonexistent (Coleman 1990; Fukuyama 2001; Putnam 1993; Taylor 1997;
Vermeij 2007).

The conclusion then has been that trust produces

an environment conducive for collective action (Putnam 1993;
Putnam 2000; Putnam 2002).
Yet, it has also been argued conversely that widespread
trust, friendship networks, and the ensuing social norms
enabling collective community efforts are often learned and
strengthened through memberships and participation in voluntary
organizations like church groups, labor unions and parentteacher associations (Jung 2003; Putnam 2000; Putnam 2002;
Putnam, Leonardi, and Nanetti 1993; Vermeij 2007).

This is

true, particularly when such activity generates positive,
tangible outcomes like reduced deviance and crime.

In short, it

may be the case that collective organizational participation
breeds trust (Brehm and Rahn 1997; Jung 2003), and perhaps
proximally more extensive networks of friends.
Ultimately, whether collective organizational participation
is a cause or a consequence of the friendships and trust
defining social capital is left unresolved in the literature.
Scholars do not seem perturbed by the directional uncertainty
here either, as little effort has been made to address it.
However, what is clear is that when collective organizational
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participation thrives it embodies the resources and actions that
produce “good” social capital (Dowla 2006; Grootaert 2006;
Narayan and Pritchett 1999) within high trust, network-dense
communities.
Social capital then is clearly defined by friendship
networks, attitudes like trust that bond members of a network,
and the resulting collective resources and actions.
of its structural causes?

But, what

There is lesser discussion in the

extant literature, and considerable bifurcation in theoretical
perspectives when it is discussed.

Four area structural factors

are commonly identified as keys to understanding the
development, or lack thereof, of social capital: economic
status, ethnic heterogeneity, residential stability, and
population density.
Economic status, and poverty status in particular, is
prominent in discourse on the causes of social capital.
Scholars identify status deficiencies like low household income
and unemployment in a community as among the more disruptive
variables to social capital development.

The daily hardships

encountered in pursuit of basic necessities when financial means
are lacking drains residents of the will and energy to invest in
social trust and civic activism (Sampson, Raudenbush, and Earls
1997; White 2006).

The urban poor are especially challenged in

developing social capital as a resource for addressing issues
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like crime victimization (Williamson, Ashby, and Webber 2006).
However, social capital is also among the commodities that
help poorer households mitigate the effects of resource
deprivation. It can provide alternative means of “getting by or
getting ahead” in the absence of other useful commodities
(Putnam 2000).

Research predating Coleman’s confirmed

reciprocal social networks are vital for the urban poor to cope
with hardships in their lives (Perlman 2006).

Among residents

of poverty-stricken Roma communities, networks imbued with
social capital have proven vital in the decision for Roma to
migrate (Pantea 2013).

Geleta (2014) notes how in certain

communities poorer individuals rely heavily on social capitalbased credit as an alternative means of financial exchange.
Social capital literature further shows that the extent of
ethnic heterogeneity in a community is important for social
capital.

Increasingly diverse ethnic communities tend to be

associated with decreasing caches of social capital (Briggs
2010; Putnam 1993), which is argued to be at least partially
attributable to a lack of trust.

Individuals and groups within

ethnically diverse communities experience more obstacles in
discovering common values and behavioral norms that would
engender such trust (Collier 1998; Knack and Keefer 1997).
Conversely, greater ethnic homogeneity is thought to minimize
trust barriers and ease the path towards reaching common ground
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among fellow community members, which ultimately stimulates
social capital.
Yet, there are again conflicting theoretical perspectives
here.

While ethnic heterogeneity is widely viewed as correlated

with social capital, whether it increases or decreases social
capital is debated.

In fact, when levels of civil unrest and

rebellious activity are used as indicators of social capital,
Collier (1998) maintains both outcomes are possible.

He

specifies that among disaffected ethnic groups in African
countries, the diversity across these groups can stimulate
social capital via organizational activity necessary for civil
rebellion. This occurs when such diversity is moderate and
government disapproval among the groups is largely congruent.
However, as the number of dissatisfied ethnic groups swell,
coordination of rebellious activity becomes increasingly
difficult and thus the increased diversity results in a
diminishing capacity for such capital to develop (Collier 1998).
Where residential stability/mobility is concerned, social
capital is widely seen to benefit from stability in a
community’s population. The importance of such stability to
social capital is explained by Putnam (1995) in his “repotting
hypothesis”.

Here he argues root systems undergirding social

networks in a community take time to develop much in the same
way strong roots in a plant need time to mature. Constant flux
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in neighborhood population results in a disruption of these root
systems at the expense of social capital, and particularly civic
engagement (Putnam 1995).

This observation is echoed by other

scholars (Temkin and Rohe 1998; Warner and Rountree 1997; White
2006).
In determining causes of social capital, population density
factors into the mix given how vital resources like food,
shelter, and education are differentially distributed in most
stratified social settings (Massey 2007).

A number of

perspectives maintain that as population density increases, so
too does demand for and subsequent depletion of such resources
(Cho and McLeod 2007; Durkheim 2008 (1893); Ladbrook 1988).
Consequently, higher density results in more groups contending
for greater power and access to resources, with a result of more
opportunities for social capital via interaction and
participation recruiting (Cho and McLeod 2007).
The competition for resources characteristic of high-density
neighborhoods can foster exclusionary practices.

Residents in

such communities can rally together in the effort to either
unfairly deny others access to these resources (e.g., racial
exclusion in prosperous housing markets) or otherwise position
themselves more favorably to acquire them (DeFilippis 2001).
This hyper-competitive environment also breeds a certain brand
of individualism in disposition and behavior, and thus helps
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clarify why urban dwellers interact less and seemingly generate
less social capital (Morenoff, Sampson, and Raudenbush 2001).
Such “downside outcomes” to social capital exposes how
population density has equal propensity to foster divisive and
inclusive versions of social capital, as well as how the
benefits of social capital are tied to power-laden institutions
and advantaged individuals/groups more so in high density urban
areas (DeFilippis 2001).
Having now reviewed the history and more recent development
of social capital theory, as well as established a working
definition of social capital that acknowledges some of its more
prominent causes, the next section examines one possible
consequence when social capital is lacking – neighborhood crime.
Beyond the literature on social capital itself, this discussion
draws heavily on two criminological theories – social
disorganization and collective efficacy – whose core precepts
bear a striking similarity to those found in social capital
theory.

SOCIAL CAPITAL AND CRIME
Central to this dissertation are the premises that criminal
activity in a community is linked to the level of social capital
within it, and that crime is generally lower in communities with
larger caches of social capital.

!
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capital reduce crime?

While there is plenty of evidence that

social capital reduces crime, theoretical explanations for these
observations has not always been so apparent.

When efforts have

been made to explain the connection, emphasis has tended to
focus on the nature, quality and density of social networks.
For instance, according to Putnam (2000), social networks
form the infrastructure of social capital.

Thus, when those

networks are weak, social capital is weak; when they are strong,
social capital thrives (Messner, Rosenfeld, and Baumer 2004;
Putnam 2000).

In turn, social capital’s capacity to reduce

crime is commensurate with the strength of social networks.
Network-rich communities are more adept at reducing crime
through exertion of social control (especially over young
people) in the community (Messner, Rosenfeld, and Baumer 2004;
Rosenfeld, Messner, and Baumer 2001).
It is specifically the networks related to bridging social
capital that tend to lower crime, however.

Bridging social

capital is a product of volunteerism within communities and
efforts to reach beyond the immediate community’s borders to
form alliances with groups and institutions in more distant
locales (Akcomak and Weel 2011; Cancino 2005).

These efforts

result more often in an expansion and enhancement of a
community’s social network system.

In turn, crime reduction

efforts are expanded because these network lines tend to funnel
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in knowledge and resources from more distant communities, such
as best practices in crime reduction efforts.

Extended lines of

trust are also fostered through bridging social capital, and
trust is vital to safer, stable communities.
For instance, the inclination of residents in a community to
support bridged networks by looking out for the welfare of
residents in distant neighborhoods along with their own is
bolstered when there is trust that those distant residents are
reciprocating such concern (Rosenfeld, Messner, and Baumer
2001).

With the broadened trust that is forged from such

cohesive social bridges, there is an increase in radii of
surveillance, citizen participation with formal law enforcement,
and heightened risk for offenders of being caught.

Thus, trust

across communities will tend to reduce crime by increasing the
likelihood of identifying and arresting offenders (Akcomak and
Weel 2011; Sampson 1988).
Additionally, social capital increases the likelihood of
arrest and the costs of committing crime by enhancing mechanisms
of informal social control and civic engagement (Akcomak and
Weel 2011).

Particularly concerning the latter, civic

engagement is cited as a dimension of social capital (Akcomak
and Weel 2011; Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales 2004), and
civically engaged citizens are more inclined to look out for the
safety and comfort of their neighbors.
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They are more likely to
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look after one another’s children and property, and feel
comfortable in calling upon fellow neighbors to do the same.
For at least these reasons, community residents perceive social
capital as valuable and those possessing and willing to offer it
develop a positive reputation and gain acceptance within their
community (Akcomak and Weel 2011).

Consequently, social capital

further reduces crime by discouraging residents within such
communities from committing crime at the risk of losing their
own cache of social capital and the aforementioned benefits that
come with it (Akcomak and Weel 2011).
Liu’s (2005) research into prisoner reentry highlights yet
another way in which social capital reduces crime.

Social

capital is largely defined by way of the presence and integrity
of cohesive social networks, as well as the deeply embedded
trust underlying such networks.

Both are invaluable resources

to an ex-offender seeking reintegration back into a law-abiding
collective.

This is because, conjointly, these resources

undergird a conduit between ex-offenders and legitimate social
activities like steady employment, education attainment, and
marriage that help build or rebuild the trust of the community.
The rationale for the importance of a community’s trust is
that citizens typically need trust to warrant reaching out to
ex-offenders.

As citizens gain trust that an ex-offender has

been sufficiently punished for his/her transgression(s) and is
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sincere about wanting to reintegrate into the community, they
will be more inclined to support ex-offenders’ efforts to enter
legitimate social institutions by extending their own
connections to such reforming criminals.

A community’s

residents are also more likely to support ex-offenders if the
ex-offenders’ families are trustworthy.

Such support may come

by way of offering general life advice, or more specific
examples such as insight on job opportunities, emotional support
while reintegrating back to the community, and/or encouraging
fellow residents to offer similar support.
Steady work and family development represent stability and
security in a neighborhood (Sampson 1987; Sampson and Groves
1989).

There are also notable recidivism-reducing effects of

being connected to formal institutions like stable employment
and marriage (Liu 2005).

Thus, access to the types of networks

and trust that define social capital are vital towards lowering
crime by helping to facilitate viable pathways for previous
offenders to those institutions representative of a law-abiding
lifestyle.
Importantly, insight into how social capital impacts
neighborhood crime does not draw exclusively from social capital
literature nor does it always use the language of social capital
(Beyerlein and Hipp 2005).

Early social disorganization models

from Shaw and McKay (1942, 1949), as well as modern systemic
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(Bursik 1999; Bursik and Grasmick 1992) and collective efficacy
models (Sampson, Raudenbush, and Earls 1997) impart important
criminological theories of neighborhood crime.

All of them

include many ideas and concepts similar to those found in the
social capital literature.

In fact, Sampson, a major figure in

both social disorganization and collective efficacy, has
discussed social capital.

He writes “…lack of social capital is

one of the primary features of socially disorganized
neighborhoods” (Sampson 1992:78).

Any discussion then of the

role of social capital in understanding neighborhood crime must
include discussion of this extended literature.

Social Disorganization
The theory of social disorganization was developed from work
done in Chicago.

It contends juvenile delinquency and other

forms of deviance occur more often in communities where
residents fail to realize common values and maintain control
over their surroundings – thus, becoming socially disorganized
(Sampson and Groves 1989; Shaw and McKay 1942, 1949).

Factors

predictive of social disorganization in the literature include
low economic status, ethnic heterogeneity, and high residential
mobility (Sampson and Groves 1989; Shaw and McKay 1942, 1949).
Communities high in these factors are marked by anonymity among
neighbors, sparse local organizations, and young people
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disconnected from adult supervision (Amato 1993; Anderson 2007
(1994); Bursik 1999; Bursik and Grasmick 1993; Wirth 1938).
With these qualities present, socially disorganized
communities lack the capacity to engineer the types of social
ties and norms proven to assist in regulating negative behavior
and resolving problems between residents (Bursik 1999; Bursik
and Grasmick 1993).

Chief elements of social capital like trust

and civic engagement are closely aligned with well-organized
neighborhoods (Rosenfeld, Messner, and Baumer 2001), and thus it
should be expected that lower levels of such attributes also
characterize socially disorganized residential settings.

Lower

civic engagement undermines the development of interpersonal
connections that foster informal social control useful in
preventing criminal and violent behavior(Rosenfeld, Messner, and
Baumer 2001).

Similarly, trust is argued to be critical in

maintaining the type of informal social connections that lead to
a civically engaged populace capable of effective social
organization and thus better management of crime rates
(Rosenfeld, Messner, and Baumer 2001; Sampson, Morenoff, and
Earls 1999; Sampson, Raudenbush, and Earls 1997).
Albeit popular as a framework for community crime analyses,
Shaw and McKay’s original social disorganization model garnered
its share of criticisms.

Included among them was an

overreliance on past crime data from official records and the
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inappropriateness of using Census data to address effects
between community structure and crime (Sampson and Groves 1989).
Their work has also been cited for its inability to test the
theory beyond the effects of median income, racial composition,
and residential mobility due to limitations in the available
data (Sampson and Groves 1989).

Further noted was the inability

of the original model to separate social disorganization’s
causes from its consequences (Sampson and Groves 1989).
In light of these criticisms, a number of contemporary
scholars sought to improve upon the Shaw and McKay model.
Noteworthy among these revisionists were Robert Sampson and W.
Byron Groves (1989).

They drew from the systemic model of

Kasarda and Janowitz (1974) which contends length of residence
is the “key exogenous factor influencing community behavior and
attitude”.

They further stated that “the major intervening

variables are friendship and kinship bonds and formal and
informal associational ties within the local community” (Kasarda
and Janowitz 1974:330).

In attempting to clarify the concept of

social disorganization and separate it from its causes and its
effect, Sampson and Groves argued that organization can be found
in a community’s local friendship networks, participation in
local organizations, and management of unsupervised youth
(informal social control).

In turn, as demonstrated in Figure

1, broken or missing friendship networks, unsupervised teens and
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low organizational participation lead to higher rates of crime:

Figure 1. Sampson and Groves’ Model of Social Disorganization

Importantly, they also discussed the factors that led to
social disorganization.

Economic status, ethnic heterogeneity,

and residential stability were key as argued in earlier work.
They also included urbanization – identified and dummy-coded as
communities located in central-city locations – with the
hypothesis that urbanization weakens local kinship and
friendship networks and impedes participation in local affairs.

Collective Efficacy
Sampson’s original attempt with Groves to refine Shaw and
McKay’s model also had its share of flaws.

For instance, it has

been noted for low variance explained as well as limitations in
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number and operationalization of community organization
variables.

In addition, the dubiousness of the organizational

participation measure employed was also cited.
Noting these flaws, Sampson sought to advance social
disorganization theory and earlier efforts to improve it as one
of the chief architects of collective efficacy.

Sharing quite a

bit in common conceptually with social capital (Cancino 2005),
collective efficacy theory offers insight into many of the same
pathways that connect social capital to crime.

Collective

efficacy is defined as the presence of interpersonal social
cohesion among neighbors and willingness to intervene on behalf
of the common good (Sampson, Raudenbush, and Earls 1997).
Sampson and colleagues (1997) contend increases in
collective efficacy lead to less crime.

The theory further

states that much of the variation in collective efficacy is
attributable to residential stability (homeownership +
residential tenure), concentrated disadvantage (poverty +
resource deprivation), and ethnic heterogeneity (racial
diversity + segmentation).

Accordingly, collective efficacy

within a community decreases with concentrated disadvantage and
increases when residential stability is high.

Ultimately, it

mediates the relationships neighborhood disadvantage and
residential instability maintain with interpersonal violence.
Implicit within the theory is the notion that in communities
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where residents own and maintain homes, a desire to protect the
value of such property and maintain social control in the
surrounding community is cultivated, as are beliefs that fellow
neighbors should behave similarly.

In this way, a communal

understanding between residents is fostered in which trust and
civic reciprocity become valued commodities.

Social unity is

fortified under such conditions, as residents collectively
conclude that crime and other forms of social disorder are
detrimental to the community’s prosperity.

Through socially-

sanctioned community investments, residents become more trusting
of fellow neighbors and more inclined to act to uphold positive
behavioral norms.
The kind of social trust and reciprocal norms embedded
within collective efficacy take time to mature.

As White (2006)

articulated, the development of ties may require time spent with
neighbors in such endeavors as helping neighbors work on their
cars, supervising children or watching over their property when
they are away.

Thus, the longer residents live and invest in

their communities (the higher residential stability is), the
stronger and more expansive collective efficacy is expected to
be.

Conversely, resource deprivation by way of limited

educational opportunities, inequities in political
representation and employment scarcity robs a community of
assets conducive to developing collective efficacy.
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Concentrated disadvantage, in conjunction with weak collective
efficacy produces neighborhood crime and disorder (White 2006).
Thus far the discussion has centered around the role that
social capital, and the related concept of collective efficacy
have in reducing neighborhood rates of crime.

Before concluding

a discussion of the role of social capital in neighborhood crime
however acknowledgement should be made of the possibility that
an individual’s or neighborhood’s social capital could be used
to increase crime.

There is some thought that criminals vary in

their capacity to succeed in illicit enterprises based upon the
breadth and quality of their social collaborations with
lucrative offenders (Nguyen and Bouchard 2013).

Not all

offenders are equally capable of forging and maintaining such
connections.

Those who are usually achieve greater prosperity

in crime precisely because they can leverage those networks into
resources like knowledge about new illicit opportunities,
strategies for avoiding incarceration, and general social
support/encouragement of their involvement in criminal endeavors
(Burt 2000; Hansen 1995; Lederman, Loayza, and Menendez 2001;
McCarthy and Hagan 2001; Nguyen and Bouchard 2013).
Some scholars have argued social capital – even just the
capacity for producing it – tends to increase exponentially with
the size of an offender’s networks.

The chances for prosperity

in illicit behavior grow then as their networks grow (McCarthy
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and Hagan 2001; Nguyen and Bouchard 2013).

Furthermore, where

violent criminals are active participants with law-abiding
citizens in the types of exchanges that produce and/or are
produced by social capital, the influence of such criminal
elements may result in propensity for further violent offending
within the community (Lederman, Loayza, and Menendez 2001).
When tightly bonded, these community members may also become
prone to perceive criminal behavior (violent or otherwise) as a
necessary means of goal achievement, offer protection for
criminals and possibly even revere some law-breaking behavior as
aspirational (Lederman, Loayza, and Menendez 2001).
Distinguishing between social capital and collective
efficacy.

Throughout the literature, a common perception is

that social capital and collective efficacy are very similar.
Given the similarity in their basic components and precepts, it
can be difficult to distinguish between them.

In fact, White

(2006) posits that social capital is collective efficacy.

More

specifically, collective efficacy entails positive social
capital via relationships forged through strong cohesion and
trust between neighbors (White 2006).
Further implied throughout the literature is the notion that
social capital and collective efficacy similarly aid in
minimizing both minor incivilities and more serious disruptions
of civic order.

!

The two constructs are unified by an emphasis
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on social cohesiveness and trustworthiness between neighbors as
key components of safe and stable communities.

Also shared is

the belief that such attributes generally strengthen and are
strengthened by a commitment to mutually beneficial exchanges
between neighbors over time.

However, for all their

similarities, social capital and collective efficacy are
distinguishable from each other with respect to their effects on
criminal and other disorderly conduct.
Social capital refers to the potential resources derived
from social networks cohering a community’s residents that are
available to address disorder in the community (Brehm and Rahn
1997; Cancino 2005; Morenoff, Sampson, and Raudenbush 2001).
Collective efficacy is regarded as the application of specific
resources like trust and willingness to intervene in order to
address such disorder and related social ills (Cancino 2005;
Sampson, Raudenbush, and Earls 1997).

The latter is an outcome

in communities where social capital is abundant (Cancino 2005;
Morenoff, Sampson, and Raudenbush 2001; White 2006).

This is

especially so when the social bonds symbolic of social capital
allow for the process of turning those bonds into desired
outcomes (Morenoff, Sampson, and Raudenbush 2001).
While in theory a community could possess social capital
without necessarily producing collective efficacy, the latter is
unlikely to exist without the prerequisite social capital needed
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to spark it.

The relationship then between social capital and

collective efficacy is not unlike that which is found in physics
between potential and kinetic forces of energy.

In this case,

social capital serves as the potential force available for
communities to address crime and social disorder; collective
efficacy is the kinetic force that is the efforts made to reduce
crime and disorder when the potential force of social capital is
activated.

Social Capital, Crime and the Rural-Urban Divide
Much of the work on social capital, and the equally
compelling research on social disorganization and collective
efficacy, stems from scholars based in Western industrialized
nations largely centered in the U.S.

As a consequence, their

foci has typically overlooked rural communities.

The lesser

focus on rural spaces in both general ecological literature on
crime and that which specifically incorporates social capital
suggests that either rural areas are not as prone to crime as
urban areas, or that it is justifiable to simply take what has
been learned in urban settings and apply them directly to their
rural counterparts.
acceptable?

But is this treatment of rural communities

Or is there a divide between urban and rural crime

phenomena that requires more attention to rural communities?
In fact, a fair amount of literature contends the latter;
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rural communities exhibit rates of criminal activity similar to
urban neighborhoods, and in certain instances more so.

Over

half of the 30 U.S. counties with the highest homicide rates are
categorized as nonmetropolitan (Weisheit, Falcone, and Wells
2006).

In addition, amphetamine and cocaine usage are no less

than 50% more likely among rural youth compared to urban youth
(Weisheit, Falcone, and Wells 2006).

Finally, access to drug

treatment centers is often more problematic in rural
neighborhoods due to greater distances and public transportation
limitations (Weisheit and Donnermeyer 2000; Weisheit, Falcone,
and Wells 2006).

Internationally, we find that juvenile

delinquency among boys in Portugal is largely consistent between
urban and rural settings across 11 measured delinquent acts
(Cardoso, Perista, Carrilho, and Silva 2013), and data on
suicide in Australia reveals that nearly 45% of all suicides
among men between 1990 and 2008 were from rural residents
(McPhedran and Leo 2013).
Consider that smaller rural communities are characterized
more with "bonding social capital" than larger urban communities
due to the presence of rigid familial networks and friendship
norms (Beggs, Haines, and Hurlbert 1996; Beggs, Hurlbert, and
Haines 1996; Fischer 1995; Hofferth and Iceland 1998).

This

type of social capital has also proven to correlate with higher
rates of sexual assaults, incidents of domestic violence, and
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homicides (Beyerlein and Hipp 2005; DeKeseredy et al. 2007).
Particularly with domestic violence, heightened rural patriarchy
and norms of rural life breed complicity to such crimes
(DeKeseredy et al. 2007).

Rural communities have also been

known to overlook or excuse the abuse of a domestic partner if
the abuser is a member of one or more valued networks, if the
abuse victim is excluded from such networks, or if the victim is
considered to be of lower status compared to the abuser within
those networks (DeKeseredy et al. 2007).
Yet, despite such data, a number of myths and misperceptions
about rural communities abound.

Consider that, when compared to

urban neighborhoods, rural neighborhoods are thought to be more
homogenous settings where residents are more likely to know each
other’s affairs, interact with one another regularly, and share
core sets of values (DeKeseredy et al. 2007; Websdale 1995).
Where such presumptions of similarity and cohesion are in play,
it is not much of a stretch to imagine some scholars concluding
the effects of social interaction and cohesion are already well
understood in rural communities.

Of course, even a cursory

review of the current rural literature would reveal such
presumptions are deeply flawed.

While rural neighborhoods may

be relatively homogenous, rural communities are far from
universally the same.

There are, in fact, numerous types of

rural communities and each is distinguishable by such factors as
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level of industrialization, trends in population shifts, and
socioeconomic characteristics (DeKeseredy et al. 2007; Jobes,
Barclay, Weinand, and Donnermeyer 2004).
Be that as it may, the myth of homogeneity persists.

Thus,

when national crime data (i.e., the FBI Uniform Crime Reports)
routinely show urban crime rates as higher than rural crime
rates, all or nearly all rural communities are believed to be
relatively crime free (DeKeseredy et al. 2007).

Weisheit et al

(2006) noted how many people assume crime rarely occurs in the
rural U.S., and both mass media and crime literature greatly
perpetuate this assumption (Donnermeyer, Jobes, and Barclay
2006; Jones 1995; Lichter, Amundson, and Lichter 2003).
Limited data collection and low consensus on findings, along
with weaknesses in measurement validity and reliability stemming
from disagreement over the conceptualization of rurality in
criminological research(DeKeseredy et al. 2007; Donnermeyer,
Jobes, and Barclay 2006; Weisheit, Falcone, and Wells 2006) adds
to the confusion.

Social science has not often identified units

of analyses in rural communities that match up with urban
communities in such a way that would allow for comparable
assessment of the effects of community crime models derived from
social disorganization and social capital (Petee and Kowalski
1993; Reisig and Cancino 2004).

Furthermore, while social

interactions are important to quality of life in both urban and
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rural communities, social science scholars have also had trouble
discerning the processes through which social ties develop in
the latter (Reisig and Cancino 2004).

This hampers

comprehension of social phenomena like crime in rural settings.
The argument for disentangling urban and rural communities
in this discourse is strengthened when considering the
structural and cultural nuances separating the two area types.
For example, one school of thought stemming from Durkheimian
literature is that urban communities are more prone to
structural pressures conducive to law-breaking activity and a
diminished capacity to restrain citizens from behaving deviantly
(Durkheim 2008 (1893); Ladbrook 1988).

As Durkheim observed,

the nature of urban life differs remarkably from rural living,
and certain pressures on social life in large cities stem from a
combination of forces commensurate with rapid industrialization
in urban communities during the late 19th century and ever since.
Chief among these forces are heightened individualism and
diminished cohesion with neighbors resulting from greater
competition for resources and hierarchical positioning of
occupations (Durkheim 2008 (1893); Ladbrook 1988).
Durkheim argues city dwellers tend to feel less connected to
their fellow citizens under such conditions, viewing them more
as obstacles towards success in the hyper-competitive
environment associated with the newer industrial way of life
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(Durkheim 2008 (1893); Ladbrook 1988).

Furthermore, compared to

lower density rural areas, Durkheim says cities are governed
more by what is morally correct at an individual level versus
the moral good of the community.

Thus, interpretation of laws

in urban communities are more likely to seek protection of
individual rights, and the legal enforcement of social behavior
is relegated almost exclusively to formal institutions.
Indeed, the difference between urban and rural communities
is vividly illustrated when considering evidence on the impact
of structural factors like population density (Cho and McLeod
2007; McCulloch 2003), residential stability (Putnam 1995;
Putnam 2000), and poverty (Collier 1998; Halpern 2005) on
neighborhood-level crime patterns.

Weisheit (2006) notes the

enduring belief that while rural communities carry the capacity
to enforce rules of conduct through informal measures, higher
density urban communities have typically made such measures less
practical.

Accordingly, formal measures of social control

(i.e., law enforcement agencies, state-governed court systems)
have become more relevant and relied upon to police urban areas.
Ladbrook (1988) noted in these denser urban communities that the
anonymity and social schism characteristic of such settings also
allows for lower probability of detection for those engaging in
criminal activity and less harm to one’s reputation as a result
of such behavior.

!

!

51
Aside from high population density, another structural

feature – the mobility of residents – has been a constant in
major cities since the late 19th/early 20th centuries (Kasarda and
Janowitz 1974; Wirth 1938).

Much of this activity is traceable

back to the Industrial Revolution, where migrations away from
rural communities into large and complex metropolitan
neighborhoods were a frequent occurrence (Wirth, 1938).

The

constant influx of jobseekers from non-urban locales both
foreign and domestic into sprawling urban neighborhoods during
this period often entailed an abandonment of preexisting ideals
conducive to rural life. Shifts in favor of those more
appropriate to city living such as social obligations shifting
to individual rights and material values supplanting ancestral
ones occurred.

Such transition was rarely easy, and in

instances of failure to adopt urban ideals and practices,
illicit alternative opportunities and behaviors often became
more viable as a means for certain newcomers to cope (Ladbrook
1988).
Consideration of another structural component distinguishing
urban and rural communities, poverty, is also necessary.

It

reveals shifting residency trends among middle- and upper-income
classes away from large dense cities, and the subsequent
emergence of resource-deprived ghetto communities within these
cities.

!
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deindustrialization trends endemic to large cities have spurred
an exodus of employers and non-poor residents alike to suburban
enclaves peripheral to large urban cities and foreign markets.
Both of these are less accessible to those too poor and/or illtrained to maintain access to the newly-relocated employers and
wealthier neighbors.

The aftermath in U.S. neighborhoods has

been a clustering of low-income residents severely crippled by
widespread unemployment, low education status, and frayed social
bonds (Anderson 2007 (1994); Kasarda 1989; Sugrue 1993; Wilson
1987; Wilson 1996).
Coupled with drastically lowered volume of job opportunities
suitable to low-skilled labor employment and compensation for
such employment in more urban neighborhoods (Chaskin 1997;
Kasarda 1989; Sugrue 1993), the chances for lower-class citizens
to pursue legitimate means of goal achievement have reduced
dramatically (Lee, Maume, and Ousey 2003).

Residents of these

impoverished inner-city ghettoes have often found themselves
drawn to criminal endeavors and/or other alternative acts of
deviance to alleviate the effects of such concentrated poverty
(Ohmer, Warner, and Beck 2010; Wilson 2009).
far from an exclusively metropolitan problem.

Yet, poverty is
Coverage and

discourse in ecological social literature tends to favor larger
cities.

There is compelling evidence, however, that

nonmetropolitan neighborhoods actually experience more damage
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from neighborhood-scale poverty than metropolitan communities
(Albrecht, Albrecht, and Albrecht 2000; Lichter and Eggebeen
1992; Tolbert and Lyson 1992).
Concerning the differences in cultural traits between urban
and rural neighborhoods, the close-knit networks and exchanges
with family and friends often associated with social capital are
weighted more heavily in nonmetropolitan neighborhoods.

This is

due largely to an enduring characteristic of wide dispersion
between neighbors and kin in such communities, as well as the
presence of certain distinctions of rural living.

Factors such

as seasonal farming demands, less sophisticated road networks,
and lack of public transportation make developing weaker social
ties extending beyond those immediate connections less feasible
(Weisheit, Falcone, and Wells 2006).

This adherence to closer,

more familiar networks is commensurate with a homogeneity in
social life and disposition among neighbors in nonmetropolitan
communities that lends itself to the bonding type of social
capital (Crawford 2006).

On the other hand, the cohesion and

homogenous way of living associated more with nonmetropolitan
neighborhoods tends to break down in larger metropolitan
communities.

This is also due to a combination of the emphasis

on individualism over community orientation and structural
pressures towards deviance (Crawford 2006; Putnam 2000).
Typically comprised of more diverse population groupings as well
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(Chaskin 1997; Wirth 1938), we should not expect to see the same
type of social capital between urban and rural neighborhoods.
Nevertheless, while the nature of social capital between
urban and rural communities may differ, the concept is just as
viable no matter which end of the urbanization spectrum a
community occupies.

Acclaimed author and urban philosopher Jane

Jacobs (1961) accentuated this point when discussing social
capital.

She stated specifically that one staple of

nonmetropolitan communities, homogeneity or “togetherness” (the
notion that sharing anything among fellow residents means
sharing much), is a divisive force in urban communities (Jacobs
1961).

She argued it need not be highlighted as a pivotal

element to defining social capital in these settings.

Jacobs’

challenges previous interpretations of social capital
highlighting the development of civic virtue through
neighborhood homogeneity and kinship ties.

Her contention was

that neighbors need not be so similar along cultural or
sociodemographic grounds for social cohesion to occur (Crawford
2006; Jacobs 1961).
This is not to say she devalued the role of social capital
in creating safe communities; quite the contrary, Jacobs opined
that social capital (or “togetherness”, as she put it) is what
most differentiated safety in neighborhoods (Jacobs 1961).
Rather, her position was that the natural development of
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informal social connections – not demographic homogeneity or
level of urbanization – was the vital building block to creating
the sort of social capital necessary for mitigating most
community safety and health concerns like crime (Jacobs 1961).
For this reason, metropolitan residential models were just as
viable to Jacobs as nonmetropolitan models in the creation and
maintenance of social capital.

To her, urban communities were

just as capable as rural or suburban neighborhoods of creating
the neighborly connections necessary in sustaining such capital.
In conclusion, the history of social capital research
reveals a concept that is a hotly debated and multifaceted.
Nonetheless, social capital is consistently defined by trust and
friendship networks, as well as the activities and resources
accruing from collective participation in local social
organizations.

Numerous structural factors also influence both

the presence and nature of social capital in a community – not
the least of which are a community’s density, residential
mobility of residents, ethnic diversity and concentration of
poor people – and one phenomena profoundly affected by its
presence or lack thereof in light of these factors is crime.
Even when not studied strictly as “social capital”, informal
social networks, trust and other enduring traits associated with
social capital have proven relevant in congruent research from
social disorganization and collective efficacy scholars.
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Despite such gains in knowledge, theoretical advancement in

social capital theory among crime scholars has been limited due
to overemphasis in the empirical research on urban communities
and overreliance upon data from neighborhoods in the US.

Both

of these trends become even clearer in the next chapter, which
offers a current state of this discourse by considering evidence
of the differences between urban and rural communities with
respect to social capital, its causes, its relationship to
crime, and the geographic settings from which such evidence
originates.

Particular attention is given to the evidence

corroborating the relationship between social capital and crime
in residential communities outside of the U.S., how scarce this
evidence compares to U.S. data, and how the contextual effect of
urbanization status in social capital literature is often
ignored.

The latter only becoming slightly more clear once

social disorganization and collective efficacy literature is
accounted for.

The concludes with a statement of this

dissertation’s hypotheses, derived from the key argument that
differentiating between urban and rural communities matters in
investigations and applications of social capital-crime models
in foreign settings like the UK.
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CHAPTER III
EMPIRICAL LITERATURE
In this chapter, a close examination of research on both the

causes of social capital and social capital’s connection to
neighborhood-level effects like crime reveals a variety of
complex studies that occasionally contradict in findings.

It is

also clear that these studies are remarkably skewed towards
urban areas predominantly in the U.S., and often overlooks the
contextual impact of urbanization.

Particularly concerning the

effect of social capital on crime, while a fair amount of
documentation stems from evidence outside of the U.S., such
evidence is considerably limited when compared to data from
American communities. Yet, there are indications that accounting
for urbanization status more, and adding to the cadre of
international studies would help clarify some of the confusion
stemming from research into social capital’s causes and its
effects on crime.

CAUSES OF SOCIAL CAPITAL IN RURAL AND URBAN COMMUNITIES
Within social capital literature, several cited and often
debated causes are implicated in determining how much social
capital a community has available.

One is residential

stability, the length of residential tenure within a
neighborhood and its level of population flux.
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population density, which is typically a composite construct of
both population count and the relative spatial closeness or
distance between residents in a neighborhood.

The variance in

ethnic backgrounds among residents in a community and the extent
to which these residents peacefully coexist with one another,
ethnic heterogeneity, is a third cause.

Finally, the economic

health of residents – economic disadvantage, or simply poverty –
is also regarded as a significant cause.

However, the

literature wrestles with some challenges given that there has
not always been agreement on whether these causes result in more
social capital or less, and at times even fails to confirm any
relationship with said causes.
For instance, the importance of residential stability in
social capital development is supported by evidence indicating
community ties are stronger and neighborhoods overall healthier
when there is less residential turnover (Crutchfield, Geerken,
and Gove 1982; Hagan, MacMillan, and Wheaton 1996; Putnam 2000).
In particular, upon reviewing crime rates from the 65 largest
Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas in the U.S.,
Crutchfield, Geerkin, and Gove’s (1982) determined high rates of
residential mobility – the inverse of residential stability –
and increasing population size place greater strains on social
integration.

Both factors are argued to be pivotal in weakening

the ratio of time and space involved in developing and
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maintaining meaningful social connections within a community.
In turn, the effectiveness of informal social control measures
is reduced and crime reduction efforts in high turnover
neighborhoods are subsequently hampered.
Institutional continuity, social network strength and
cohesion are undermined when residential stability is low
(Coleman 1990; Sampson and Graif 2009).

Sampson and Graif

(2009) examined this using data from the Project for Human
Development in Chicago neighborhoods (a large-scale survey of
nearly 8,800 residents of Chicago, IL).

Their findings revealed

residential stability has a positive correlation with social
network ties, net the effect of concentrated disadvantage and
population diversity.

Yet, observations of the positive effects

of residential stability on social capital are not always so
clear.

For example, in the same study, Sampson and Graif (2009)

observed instances where either residential stability failed to
predict certain types of social capital (i.e., leadership
involvement in parochial institutions like schools and religious
organizations) or where significant relationships with commonly
associated components like organizational involvement failed to
appear at all (Sampson and Graif 2009).
Population density also holds an important place in social
capital development.

Its importance rests on similarly

compelling and occasionally conflicting evidence as that which
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is available for residential stability.

A fair amount of

research links high population density in metropolitan areas to
increased exchanges of political knowledge, civic participation
recruitment, and enhanced non-profit growth (Cho and McLeod
2007; Graddy and Wang 2009; Saxton and Benson 2005).

In

particular, a study of nearly 300 U.S. counties by Graddy and
Wang (2009) noted how increasing philanthropy to community
foundations could be observed in larger, denser communities.
Cho and McLeod’s (2007) analysis of data from the SCCB
revealed higher density areas are more likely to yield social
capital by way of increased participation in civic life caused
by greater competition for public resources in such areas (Cho
and McLeod 2007).

In addition, McCulloch (2003) observed

population density was the sole predictive element of social
capital.

Here, social capital among men in households of Great

Britain was measured with attitudinal statements for
belongingness, orientation with informal associations, and
neighborhood activity.

However, as with Cho and McLeod’s study,

McCulloch’s observance of the relevance of population density
did not elaborate on whether the effects were consistent for
both urban and rural neighborhoods.
Furthermore, there is significant evidence that the
connection between density and social capital has some important
qualifying factors.
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homogenous communities tends to be associated more with bonding
social capital versus bridging social capital.

Thus,

connections to secondary and tertiary social networks are more
inhibited (Granovetter 1973; Putnam 2000).

Cho and McLeod

(2007) also acknowledged supporting evidence that communal
participation is lower in denser but more ethnically diverse
communities.

They explained this is due in part to diminished

psychological ties observed between residents of diverse
communities that inhibit such participation (Cho and McLeod
2007).

Denser communities tend to have a higher propensity for

citizens to observe communal life rather than actively
participate in it (Cho and McLeod 2007), thus contributing to
such weaker connections.
Freeman (2001) found that the connection between density and
social ties involved yet another important but less cited
qualifier: the proliferation of automobiles and pedestrian or
mass transit culture.

In a study of U.S. Census and

supplemental survey data on urban inequality from Atlanta, GA,
Boston, MA, and Los Angeles, CA samples, he showed that
controlling for proliferation of automobile traffic in
neighborhoods resulted in significantly fewer neighborhood
social ties (Freeman 2001).

In fact, density was no longer a

significant predictor of social ties in the study once
automobile dependency was controlled for.
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A number of social capital studies further imply ethnic

heterogeneity and social capital are negatively associated.
These findings suggest ethnically homogenous groups share
similar values and behavioral norms, thus making it easier for
group members to find common ground and subsequently generate
more trust and tighter social cohesion.

Conversely, the more

ethnically diverse a community is, the less effective it tends
to be in generating social capital.

When individuals fail to

perceive such values or norms within each other, or when groups
prove dissimilar along such attributes, it becomes much less
likely that such trust and cohesion will be developed.

Indeed,

several studies confirm diverse ethnic composition negatively
correlates with social capital by way of lower social cohesion
and trust (Fieldhouse and Cutts 2010; Putnam 2007; Sturgis,
Brunton-Smith, Read, and Allum 2011; Wickes, Zahnow, White, and
Mazerolle 2015).
Notably, compared to studies featuring residential stability
and population density as factors, a good deal more of the
evidence for social capital’s connections to ethnic
heterogeneity can be found outside of the U.S (particularly in
the U.K.).

These are still lacking in attempts to offer clarity

by considering additional factors like urbanization.

However,

the aforementioned study by McCulloch (2003) concluded social
capital is significantly lower in ethnically heterogeneous
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neighborhoods.
McCulloch (2003) argued that feelings of belonging and the
social connections yielded through such feelings are weaker the
higher ethnic diversity is in an area.

McGhee (2003) and

Goodhart (2004) respectively found social cohesion and civic
participation tend to decline when ethnic diversity is high.
Particularly in McGhee’s (2003) study of the urban Bradford
district in the U.K., he deduced such negative correlation
stemmed largely from discord among many White residents.

He

argued that they felt their needs were often overlooked in favor
of the residing non-White minorities competing for the same
limited resources in the community.
Here again, contrary evidence warrants consideration. In
particular, limited proof of social withdrawal in ethnically
diverse neighborhoods (Lolle and Torpe 2011; Savelkoul,
Gesthuizen, and Scheepers 2010; Wickes, Zahnow, White, and
Mazerolle 2015) implies ethnic diversity does not inherently
signify in all communities a lack of social capital by way of
low cohesion.

Rather, it may be that the type of social capital

more often generated in homogenous communities is less of the
bridging variety, and more of the bonding type.

Bonding social

capital flourishes more naturally when individuals of similar
ethnic backgrounds meet (McGhee 2003; Putnam 2000).
This may especially be true of immigrant communities. Here
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the decision to relocate and where to relocate to is often
dependent on the amount of community and household social
capital available for active and potential migrants alike
(Palmer and Xu 2013).

Zhou (2005) provided clarity to this very

pattern among Chinese immigrant communities in New York City.
He summarized that the social networks generated in homogenous
ethnic communities nested within larger, multiethnic settings
offered a comfort zone that members of such communities tended
to prefer due to the various sociocultural factors like
memories, customs, and language shared (Zhou 2005).
Unfortunately, as the distinction between bridging and bonding
types has not often been emphasized in previous efforts to
examine the effect of ethnic diversity on social capital, the
current research on this matter is largely speculative.
Furthermore, the operationalization of social capital seems
to matter with regard to whether a relationship with ethnic
heterogeneity is detected.

For instance, rather than defining

social capital as cohesion or trust, Vermuelen, Tillie and
Walle’s (2011) study of 96 neighborhoods in Amsterdam used
number of private foundations (defined as non-governmental, nonmembership, organizations recognized as a legal category with a
purpose of general public interest) per 1000 residents as the
main component.

Implied is that with greater concentration of

these foundations comes greater social capital in the
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neighborhoods observed.
Defining social capital in this way, they determined ethnic
diversity was positively correlated with density of social
foundations in Amsterdam neighborhoods.

It negatively

correlated, however, with density of leisure associations
(Vermeulen, Tillie, and Walle 2011).

In addition, when

considering contextual factors influencing the negative effect
of ethnic diversity, Vermeulen et al (2011) noted the polarizing
influence of fairly recent events like 9/11 and the ensuing
immigration debates throughout the Netherlands.

These are

sources of neighborhood fragmentation influencing some of the
breakdown in social cohesion and networks in more diverse
neighborhoods.
Studies exploring poverty as a cause of social capital have
typically found weak social capital to characterize communities
of extreme impoverishment.

For the most part, prevailing

thoughts have been that in poorer communities there are fewer
social connections and collaborative behavioral norms that could
serve residents in acquiring resources necessary to negate such
poverty (e.g., a quality education, lucrative employment
opportunities, adequate healthcare).

As with the literature on

the causal effects of ethnic heterogeneity, when compared to
residential stability and population density, there is somewhat
more international data to draw upon as evidence for the effects
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of poverty on social capital.
Among such findings, Heffernan’s (2002) study of HIV trends
among the urban poor in the U.K. illustrated how poorer
neighborhoods routinely struggle to access social capital and
health services that would allow for HIV treatment and safe sex
education.

This cycle is further compounded by a widespread

lack of social resources and poor cohesion attributable to
inner-city communities where the urban poor tend to reside
(Heffernan 2002).

Such factors make it even less likely for

social capital to develop in these areas.
In explaining why higher income communities are able to
generate more social capital, Narayan (1997) lays some
foundation for understanding why the reverse is true of poorer
communities.

Using government data captured from roughly 6,000

inhabitants covering 87 villages in Tanzania, Narayan provided a
rare glimpse into social capital trends within rural communities
outside of the conventional Western and often U.S.-based
settings.

Just as important, she discovered a significant

positive correlation between social capital and household
expenditures.

An increase in social capital by one standard

deviation predicted a 20 – 30% increase in spending power per
household resident in the study (Narayan 1997).

The communities

comprised of wealthier households tended to exhibit more social
capital.
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Narayan (1997) went on to present four main reasons likely

behind the stark contrast in social capital she found based on
wealth.

First, from higher levels of social capital, as

represented by activity in community associations, come more
effective government services like schools, hospitals and road
networks (Narayan 1997).

This is important because high quality

in such public services offer pathways leading away from the
resource deprivation that so often plagues the poor.
Communities can be defined as wealthy or poor based upon the
quality of such services.

Indeed, Narayan (1997) saw that the

Tanzanian villages with higher associational activity and
parental participation in local activities ultimately had the
better public resources (i.e., schools).
Secondly, she observed social cohesion typically leads to
the sharing of information that is of mutual economic benefit
within communities (Narayan 1997).

Thus, the more information

is shared amongst residents in a community, the wealthier the
overall community tends to be.

In her study, households in

villages with higher social capital were also households that
tended to share more information – particularly of an
agricultural nature – more frequently, and thus experienced
higher crop efficiency and profit as a result (Narayan 1997).
A third factor Narayan mentioned was the ability of
households within the villages to cooperate towards addressing
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problems of community-wide concern.

Villages with higher social

capital were more likely to have engaged in community road
building projects and other communal activities designed to
maintain certain shared assets that impact the overall economic
health of a community (Narayan 1997).

Finally, she noted it has

long been recognized that market transactions based on trustladen associations lead to stronger economic performance.
Accordingly, those villages in her study with higher social
capital had significantly greater likelihood of agricultural
lending and borrowing practices (Narayan 1997).
Renowned American sociologists William Julius Wilson (1996)
and Glenn Loury (1976) indirectly offered some additional
clarity to these observations.

They noted that poverty is by

definition the exclusion from social networks and institutions
that could be leveraged to obtain vital resources like quality
housing, employment and education.

In short, irrespective of

geography, it should come as no surprise that there is such
evidence of lower social capital where poverty is high.

This is

quite unfortunate, as the literature also shows that communities
infused with strong caches of social capital are able to address
poverty and resolve disputes more effectively (Woolcock 2001).
In contrast, there is some rationale for the notion that
poverty should be positively associated with social capital.
Poor households often have few other resources to call upon for
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economic survival and/or advancement aside from the
relationships they forge with fellow poor community members or
those advantageously positioned to help alleviate the effects of
income deprivation.

In fact, Woolcock (2001) noted being poor

in an “unpredictable and unforgiving world” often requires
reliance upon connections with family and friends as primary
resources to leverage against the scarcities experienced in
other important assets (e.g., money, advanced education, diverse
employment opportunities) that earmark such impoverishment.
In particular, though noted for its absence of external
social networks, bonding social capital is nonetheless relevant
as a means of coping with poverty. Close social ties with
friends and family serve to augment the lack of economic
resources among the poor, as they can and often do use each
other as assets (Portes and Landholt 1996; Woolcock 2001).
Additionally, Cage’s (2014) multi-method research on poverty in
Kenya revealed a pattern of how organizations in poor
communities transfer bonding social capital between inhabitants
of poor communities into bridging social capital.

In this way,

localized social networks are extended in relevance to connect
with agents at higher levels of governance.
With such conflicting evidence in social capital literature
on the effects of its proclaimed causes, greater clarity in the
discourse is needed.

!
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explored covariates like a community’s urbanization level.
There is already literature confirming urban and rural
communities are quite distinctive along the causal factors
cited. For instance, many geographic definitions of urbanity and
rurality use population density as a distinguishing quality,
where the denser a population is the more urban/less rural it is
(Agency 2005; Pateman 2010/2011; Wilson, Plane, Mackun,
Fischetti, Goworowska, Cohen, Perry, and Hatchard 2012; Wirth
1938).

Excluding certain areas of the Southern U.S., it has

also been found that rural areas typically carry less ethnic
diversity (Hofferth and Iceland 1998).

Rural areas also tend to

be poorer than urban (Albrecht, Albrecht, and Albrecht 2000;
Hofferth and Iceland 1998; Lichter and Eggebeen 1992), and rural
children are considerably more income- and resource-deprived
compared with their urban contemporaries (Lichter and Eggebeen
1992).

Additionally, while residential stability has been of

concern in both settings, it has typically been rural
communities that have experienced residential instability via
loss of their inhabitants to the draw of urban living.

Indeed,

from the 1940’s through the 70’s, rural populations dropped by
over 50% (Albrecht, Albrecht, and Albrecht 2000; Beale 1978;
Larson 1981), and today’s rural communities are widely less
populated compared to urban areas (Wilson et al. 2012).
Of particular importance to this proposal, the differences

!

!

71

between urban and rural areas are observable with respect to
social capital and some of its composite parts as well.

Denser

communities have often been associated with lower social capital
by way of less interpersonal social interaction, diminished
civic participation, gaps in such participation, group conflict,
and incivility (Cho and McLeod 2007; Crawford 2006; Morenoff,
Sampson, and Raudenbush 2001).

Higher density urban communities

often exhibit reduced community integration and lower support of
non-profit activities (Graddy and Wang 2009; Lincoln 1977).
Urban residents have been found to possess lower levels of
social capital in comparison to rural dwellers when density of
social connections have been included as part of a
conceptualization of social capital (Cairns, Til, and Williamson
2003; Morenoff, Sampson, and Raudenbush 2001).

Rural residents

also share strong bonds through tight friendship and kinship
networks, and are often less tolerant of crime and more
punitive-minded towards lawbreakers than urban residents
(Cancino 2005; DeKeseredy et al. 2007).
Yet, as Jacobs (1961) so staunchly counterargued, social
capital can and does exist in urban communities.

Crawford’s

(2006) research in Leeds, one of the largest and most diverse
cities in England, revealed that both community advocates known
as neighborhood wardens and local volunteer-based organizations
were critical in helping residents access important
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institutional resources. Particularly with the wardens, theirs
was a function that connected residents in various parts of
Leeds to local services by harvesting trust from both the
residents they serve and the institutions controlling access to
those vital resources (Crawford 2006).

In essence, these

wardens served as conduits of social capital in a highly
urbanized setting via the social cohesion and trust they forged
between community constituents.

Such capital allowed for

smoother, more equitable flow of vital resources to citizens
throughout the city.
Other examples throughout the literature confirm urban
social capital is a relevant concept in both Eastern and Western
settings.

In the city of Scranton, PA, Rich (2012) observed how

the appeal of Scranton neighborhoods to native residents and
returnees alike, as well as recent efforts to revitalize the
city, was rooted in social capital.

The social capital was high

stemming from strong social networks, close familiarity with
neighbors, and participation in a variety of local institutions
serving the public (e.g., local political offices).

In Los

Angeles, CA, homeless residents who were able to draw upon
social capital by way of their connections to family, friends,
and especially case workers and support staff in transitional
housing organizations greatly improved their chances of exiting
homeless status altogether (Marr 2012).
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Reynolds (2013) examined data from inner-city Black youth

throughout four main cities in England and found social capital
to be both a positive and negative influence in their lives.

On

one hand, and similar to the observations from Cage’s (2014)
Kenya research, the reciprocal networks and trust Black youth
build within their poverty-stricken and marginalized communities
act as coping mechanisms for dealing with the deprivation and
racial inequality they routinely confront.

Such capital also

serves as a resource for such youth in navigating their way out
of their dire circumstances (Reynolds 2013).
Yet, Reynolds (2013) also found the type of bonding social
capital poor Black youth in the study access occasionally
restricts their expectations of and efforts towards social
mobility.

The “pulling effect” these impoverished youth seem to

experience is a phenomenon Liu, Wang and Tao (2013) also noted
in their research of poor migrant workers in urban China.

The

effect is described as a compulsion among the urban poor to
remain in their impoverished settings.

This results from a

comfort level fostered from bonding with similarly poor
community inhabitants, and even a sense of obligation towards
those similarly deprived (Liu, Wang, and Tao 2013).

However,

given the idiosyncrasies of recent urban development and
migration in China, the incarnation of bonding social capital
they observed serves the poor in an another, more unique
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capacity (Liu, Wang, and Tao 2013).
Relative to Western countries, China’s rapid urban expansion
resulting from economic growth and rural-to-urban migration is a
newer phenomenon.

Moreover, the country’s household

registration system (known as hukou) largely determines
urban/rural status, and accordingly the level of access to urban
housing and support services.

Poorer migrant workers without

permanent urban residency status are uniquely disadvantaged in
the housing opportunities made available to them (Liu, Wang, and
Tao 2013).

Liu et al (2013) found that among those migrant

workers lacking urban hukou status, social capital in the form
of networks maintained with local residents with hukou status
was a vital resource for improving both their chances of finding
housing in their adopted cities and of obtaining higher quality
in the housing acquired.

As such, social capital ends up truly

serving the “getting ahead” function Putnam often discusses in
works like Bowling Alone (Putnam 2000).
Similarly, Palmer and Xu (2013) studied just over 3,000
laborers across seven cities in China (nearly all of whom
originated from and still held ties to rural communities) and
determined differential effects of social capital on worker
health.

Exploring both individual- and community-focused social

capital, they discovered that individual measures like support
from friends and presence of either children or older relatives
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in the household positively correlated with self-ratings of
health.

Community measures like place attachment, community

trust and overall community satisfaction also led to higher
health ratings (Palmer and Xu 2013).
However, the research revealed that the measures
neighborhood networks and connections with formal organizations
were negatively associated with worker health.

Palmer and Xu

(2013) deduced this was a sign that certain Western notions of
social capital (which tend to emphasize civic participation and
formal social networks) may not be as relevant initially or at
all in influencing positive outcomes like better health given
China’s more extensive history in using informal, individualized
networks for social capital.

These findings firmly point to the

relevance of social capital in both urban and rural places, and
that it does affect a variety of social phenomena in both types
of settings.
Yet, the literature is far from exhaustive; there is still
far too little known about the complexity of relationships
involving social capital in different community settings
(Crawford 2006).

This is no less true of the literature

pertaining to social capital and crime, and specifically how the
interaction between the two varies by urban and rural
classification.

Lin (2001) suggested a key to the difference

between urban and rural neighborhoods may lie in the demarcation
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of weak and social ties commensurate with social capital, where
the social cohesion and homogeneity of strong ties tends to be
more appropriate for rural neighborhoods versus the weaker ties
more befitting of urban neighborhoods that are less dependent
upon such cohesion.

At the very least, Crawford (2006)

suggested such a possibility as Lin’s hypothesis necessitates
greater context specificity in social capital research.
Controlling for factors like urbanization level would be a step
in this direction.
Particular to crime, does the urban or rural status of a
community matter with respect to social capital’s effect on
crime?

If so, what sorts of variations are observed, and are

those variations consistent with both national and international
settings?

To approach an answer, the criminological literature

incorporating social capital requires closer examination.

Social Capital in Rural and Urban Communities - Social Capital
and Crime
Several studies illustrate the connection between social
capital and crime within the U.S. (Clear, Rose, and Ryder 2001;
Coleman 1988; De Coster, Heimer, and Wittrock 2006; Messner,
Rosenfeld, and Baumer 2004; Neal 2011; Putnam 2000; Rosenfeld,
Messner, and Baumer 2001).

The general conclusions struck is

that social capital minimizes criminal offending, deviant
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activity, and the culture of violence often associated with
both.

Messner, Rosenfeld, and Baumer (2004, 2001) provided

particularly strong empirical support for social capital’s
crime-reducing effects through analysis of neighborhoods
represented in the General Social Survey and the SCCB.

Net the

influence of common structural covariates (e.g., resource
deprivation, population size, and Southern geographic
orientation), they confirmed in two separate studies that social
capital (measured via social trust and social engagement)
reduces homicide rates (Messner, Rosenfeld, and Baumer 2004;
Rosenfeld, Messner, and Baumer 2001).
Recalling that violence and economic disadvantage are common
indicators of delinquency and adult crime, De Coster, Heimer,
and Wittrock (2006) also found that family- and community-based
social capital reduces both the chances of young people behaving
violently and the effect of disadvantage on violence.

They

tested their hypotheses on several models of delinquency using
data from the National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent Health.
Here social capital was defined as network closure, parental
participation in the community, collective supervision, and
family cohesiveness.

They discovered that nearly all of their

family-based social capital measures play a significant role
alongside neighborhood disadvantage in predicting violence among
young people (De Coster, Heimer, and Wittrock 2006).
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cohesiveness was shown to provide especially significant
negative effects on violence in the observed models, and it
remained significant even after controlling for street-level
contextual factors conducive to crime (De Coster, Heimer, and
Wittrock 2006).
Studies such as these illustrate a tendency in the research
to corroborate social capital’s connection with crime by drawing
upon data from nationally representative studies.

In these

studies, community tends to be quite broad and little, if any,
consideration is given to how the observed relationships vary by
urbanization.

Neighborhood crime literature in general,

however, is much clearer in conveying that crime is higher and
more troublesome in denser, metropolitan neighborhoods (Akcomak
and Weel 2011; Barnett and Mencken 2002; Clinard 1964; Wolfgang
1968; Yamamura 2009).

Despite some compelling evidence to the

contrary (Bachman 1992; Liu 2005; Weisheit, Falcone, and Wells
2006), most studies conclude that densely populated metropolitan
communities are more prone to criminal offending than
nonmetropolitan ones (Blau and Blau 1982; Ladbrook 1988;
Weisheit, Falcone, and Wells 2006; Wirth 1938).
A possible, albeit seldom tested explanation for this this
observation draws from components of social capital theory.
Crime in urban residential communities has been associated with
high residential mobility (Bursik and Grasmick 1992; Kubrin and
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Herting 2003; Stults 2010) and economic instability (Weisheit,
Falcone, and Wells 2006).

Both are variables related to

weakenings in the social networks and cohesion characteristic of
strong social capital and demonstrated to reduce criminal and
deviant behavior (Ladbrook 1988).

Social capital and crime – international discourse.

We know

little in the U.S about the differences between urban and rural
areas with respect to relationships between social capital and
crime.

So too are we limited in our knowledge of such

relationships in communities internationally.

Both foreign and

domestic scholarship assessing the connection between social
capital and criminal activity in residential communities have
routinely failed to consider smaller and nonmetropolitan areas
(Cancino 2005).

Yet, when it has, social capital has shown

itself to be an influential force in reducing crime, and
producing safer and more productive communities.
In India, urban neighborhoods with little to no conflict
have been characterized by sizeable numbers of strong civic
institutions (e.g., trade unions, professional associations)
that bridge gaps of discord between communities (Cairns, Til,
and Williamson 2003; Varshney 2002).

Studies of former

Aboriginal gang members in inner-city Winnepeg, Manitoba, Canada
have shown the effectiveness of social capital among the former
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members. It helps them cope with socialization issues and obtain
educational and employment opportunities upon exiting gang life
(Bracken, Deane, and Morrissette 2009). In Northern Ireland,
Cairns and colleagues (1986) identified positive correlations
between strong associational networks and lower violence in
inner city neighborhoods (Cairns, Til, and Williamson 2003;
Darby 1986).
Social capital in the form of community organizations that
operate government-subsidized programs aimed at preventing
recidivism have yielded positive results in urban China for many
years (Liu 2005).

In urban neighborhoods throughout Paris,

France, when riots erupted in 2005 between young Muslim
immigrants and law enforcement, religious and community leaders
were pivotal in quelling the violent discord.

Mechanisms of

bridging social capital (i.e., grassroots, localized efforts to
negotiate peace terms) employed by these leaders were cited as
invaluable commodities in the peace process (Judkins 2008).
Using survey data from Finnish schools stratified by
residential density and geographic location, Salmi and Kivivuori
(2006) found that a lack of social capital was associated with
elevated juvenile delinquency.

Here, they measured social

capital as parental control, teacher control, parental support,
teacher support, neighborhood control, trust, and time spent
with the parents of their closest friends.
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social capital factors tested were negatively correlated to
juvenile delinquency.

Parental support in these schools (a

product of informal networks between parents) was particularly
strong among the factors studied.

When assessed as a full

model, parental support, teacher control, and interpersonal
trust remained relevant in the model net the effects of
structural socioeconomic variables, self-control or scholastic
achievement (Salmi and Kivivuori 2006).
Given the strong conceptual alignment between social capital
and social disorganization, it is worth noting here Sampson and
Groves’ seminal re-exploration of social disorganization theory
mentioned in the previous chapter.

They tested their hypotheses

in the U.K. and confirmed residential communities marked by
sparse friendship networks, unsupervised teenage peer groups,
and low organizational participation have disproportionately
higher rates of crime and delinquency (Sampson and Groves 1989).
In fact, each of these traits mediated many of the relationships
between such rates and other common correlates of crime (e.g.,
low SES, residential mobility).
Sampson and Groves also revealed that urbanization (in
conjunction with ethnic heterogeneity) negatively affects
friendship networks and is positively correlated with the
inability of a community to control its youth.

Additional

findings supported a large direct effect of residential
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stability on local friendship networks (net the influence of
urbanization, socioeconomic status, and ethnic heterogeneity).
Positive correlations between family disruption and disorderly
peer-group behavior by teenagers were also found.

Finally, they

found a large independent effect of unsupervised teenage peer
groups on burglary, motor vehicle theft, and vandalism (Sampson
and Groves 1989).
Making the case for expanding international studies of
social capital effects on crime.

For at least two reasons,

Sampson and Groves’ seminal social disorganization work serves
as a viable indirect attempt to examine the influence of urban
and rural variations on social capital’s effect on crime in a
setting outside the U.S.

First, variables like organizational

participation and friendship networks in Sampson and Groves’
early social disorganization model also define social capital.
Second, this model specifically incorporated urbanization.
However, as theirs was not a direct study of social capital,
Sampson and Groves’ social disorganization research is not
nearly enough to address the uncertainty in international crime
literature about the effects of social capital across levels of
urbanization.

Additionally, even if theirs was a more direct

exploration of social capital, few concerted efforts to account
for urbanization in studies of social capital have been made in
the 25 years since Sampson and Groves (1989) research.
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for communities in both domestic and international settings,
there are virtually no ecological studies of social capital in
crime literature where the full spectrum of urbanization is a
focal point.
This void in the current research further fuels the growing
sentiment in recent years that expanding international focus on
social capital in crime literature is warranted.

As Halpern

(2005) articulated,
At present, we do not have easily to hand the same
comprehensive collation of data [referring to the data
Putnam and colleagues used to defend the position of
declining social capital in the U.S.] on social capital
trends in other nations, but the data we do have strongly
suggest that the US story should not be taken as
universally representative. (Halpern 2005:211)
Findings from those international studies that are available
reveal complex correlations between social capital and crime, as
well as contradictions similar to those found in the U.S. data
highlighting the criminogenic aspects of social capital.
Gang research in China has revealed certain gang
affiliations in large, densely populated cities offer
considerable benefits to ex-offenders.

The effect transpires

via a strain of social capital that compensates for the
advantages lost when positive social capital (i.e., strong
interpersonal connections to legitimate institutions like
education, employment and marriage) is unavailable (Liu 1999).
Triad gang leaders within the country have also benefited at
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times from the successful transference of social capital into
economic gains via illegitimate stock market manipulation (Lo
2010).
In the favelas (slums) of Rio De Janiero, Brazil, the
proliferation of violence committed by drug traffickers has long
been linked to a perverse version of social capital.

Here,

social capital is in the form of collusion between major
trafficking cartels, law enforcement and political officials
(Arias 2002).

Throughout these studies, and similar to what the

U.S. literature has revealed, emphasis has either been
exclusively on urban communities or no distinction has been
offered between urban and rural settings.

It is a glaring

omission given that nonmetropolitan communities have
traditionally been regarded as havens of peace, sociability, and
neighborly cohesion (Hofferth and Iceland 1998; Smith and Huff
1982; Weisheit, Falcone, and Wells 2006).

In addition, the

relatively scant empirical evidence that is available supports
the premise that neighborhood models of social capital and crime
vary by urbanization level.
Lee and Bartowski (2004) found that faith-based associations
and civic engagement were negatively correlated with juvenile
homicide among young people in US rural neighborhoods.

But the

findings do not hold in urban areas (Lee and Bartowski 2004).
They surmised that urban crime was influenced by a greater range
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of covariates (e.g., socioeconomic disadvantage, drug activity)
given that the model with those covariates was stronger than the
social capital model tested (Lee and Bartowski 2004).

They also

observed that civic engagement bound by firm moral codes seemed
to matter more for rural areas than urban ones due specifically
to the higher proportion of rural residents affiliated with
“civically engaged” religious denominations.
Faith-based associations and civic engagement were found to
be negatively correlated with murders among young people in
rural neighborhoods, but disconnected from such crime in urban
communities (Lee and Bartowski 2004).

This is likely because of

the relative absence of covariates in rural areas believed to
influence urban crime rates.

This is verified through

significantly higher estimations of model fit in urban areas for
models with those covariates than for social capital-based
models.

But by and large, these studies are not common and a

heavy skew towards urban settings characterizes crime literature
where social capital is the main independent variable.
The lack of attention on urbanization in ecological crime
discourse is not entirely surprising in light of evidence
implying urbanization may not matter.

Traditional notions of

great disparity between urban and rural crime have begun to
erode in recent years in light of data supporting the notion
there is less distinction in crime rates between communities
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along the urbanization spectrum (Weisheit and Donnermeyer 2000).
Noted among possible factors influencing this diminishing
disparity is the continuing decline in differences between
metropolitan and nonmetropolitan communities due to
standardization of and broader access to vital commodities like
education, transportation, and employment (Fischer 1995; Luloff
and Krannich 2002; Petee and Kowalski 1993; Reisig and Cancino
2004; Ritzer 2004, 2008).
Where ecological crime theories like social disorganization
and collective efficacy are the concern, there is growing
sentiment that urbanization holds little to no bearing on how
most of these theories function (Cancino 2005; Osgood and
Chambers 2000).

Thus it can be presumed such theories are just

as applicable to less urbanized settings (Laub 1983; Reisig and
Cancino 2004).

Further evidence highlights that social capital

also functions similarly between urban and rural neighborhood
types, generally flowing in a systemic fashion from private
networks to parochial ones (Reisig and Cancino 2004).
Therefore, in considering crime and crime theories specific to
residential communities, where social capital is a focus, it
could be argued that level of urbanization in a given community
is not an important factor.
Be that as it may, contrary evidence still supports the
notion that urbanization does matter and should be considered
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more often in theories on community crime precisely because
these theories are just as relevant in less urban settings.

For

instance, the main tenets of collective efficacy – mutual trust
among neighbors and the willingness to act on behalf of the
common good – are found to be characteristic of rural
neighborhoods (Jobes 1999; Osgood and Chambers 2000; Petee and
Kowalski 1993; Sampson and Bartusch 1998).

Kinship and

friendship networks associated with collective efficacy are also
strong in these types of neighborhoods and rural residents have
been found to be less tolerant of crime and more agreeable to
harsh punishment for lawbreakers in comparison to city residents
(Ball 2001; Bouley and Wells 2001; Cancino 2005; Donnermeyer,
Jobes, and Barclay 2006; Weisheit, Falcone, and Wells 2006;
Wilson 1991).

Urbanization also matters in that rural

communities have smaller populations and lower population
densities (DeKeseredy et al. 2007).

As noted previously, social

capital tends to be higher and crime lower where population
densities are lower (Akcomak and Weel 2011; Bourdieu 1985;
McCulloch 2003; Putnam 2000).
Rural residents are also more likely to contribute to
bonding social capital by way of preferential offerings of
social support to family members and close friends (Amato 1993;
Reisig and Cancino 2004) over individuals outside of such
networks.
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non-residents when victimized within rural communities in
gaining assistance from local residents.

The same structural

constraints (i.e., poverty, poor education,
homelessness/joblessness) found in urban locales contributing to
crime can also be found in nonmetropolitan places and are
similarly associated with higher rates of juvenile violence when
gone unchecked (Cancino 2005; Osgood and Chambers 2000).

Some

research even contradicts prevailing theoretical assumptions in
finding the presence of social disorganization within more rural
communities, resulting in higher youth arrest rates for violent
acts, homicide, and fear of crime (Barnett and Mencken 2002;
DeKeseredy et al. 2007; Krannich, Berry, and Greider 1989; Lee,
Maume, and Ousey 2003; Osgood and Chambers 2000; Petee and
Kowalski 1993; Spano and Nagy 2005).
Hypothesis.

Clearly, there is significant disagreement over

how crime operates outside of urban communities, and
specifically how versions of crime models influenced by social
capital operate within these settings.

One way to alleviate

such confusion, and in doing so spark advancement in
criminological theory, is by assessing how well the theory works
across multiple settings (Reisig and Cancino 2004).

In that

respect, as well as to dispel some of the general confusion
about how relational theories of crime like those incorporating
social capital vary by country and urbanization status of
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communities within each country, this dissertation proposes to
explore urbanization as a key variable differentiating
variations in residential community crime models influenced by
social capital in the U.K.

Despite compelling examples like

Bursik and Grasmick's systemic work suggesting social networks
and the process of developing those networks can mediate the
effects of structural constraints related to crime (Bursik and
Grasmick 1992; Bursik and Grasmick 1995), structural factors
have tended to be favored over relational theories like social
capital in explaining neighborhood-level crime (Albrecht,
Albrecht, and Albrecht 2000; Barnett and Mencken 2002; Laub
1983; Smith and Huff 1982).
This dissertation will specifically seek to address the
following questions:
1. Is social capital the same concept between urban and rural
communities in the U.K.?

Specifically, do traditional

indicators of social capital (friendship bonds, trust, and
organizational participation) vary significantly in their
levels across rural and urban communities in the U.K.?
2. Do structural factors (e.g., poverty, residential stability)
similarly influence crime across both rural and urban areas in
the U.K.?
3. To what extent does social capital mediate the effects of
structural characteristics on crime?
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From these questions, the hypotheses to be tested are:

- Hypothesis 1 – Social capital is not the same between urban
and rural communities given that the components vary.

In

particular, it is predicted trust and organizational
participation effects are similar across urban and rural
areas.

Exclusive friendship bonds, however, are predicted to

be significant in rural communities (bonding social capital)
and inclusive bonds are predicted to be more significant in
urban areas (bridging social capital).
- Hypothesis 2 – Concentrated disadvantage, residential
stability, and ethnic diversity affect crime in similar ways
across urban and rural communities.
- Hypothesis 3 – Net the effects of poverty, residential
stability, and ethnic diversity, social capital negatively
affects crime in U.K. communities.

However, the effects are

not uniform across levels of urbanization.
In the next chapter, the nature of the data and analytical
steps needed to complete this dissertation research are
specified.

The operationalization and analytical challenges for

the research are also reviewed.
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CHAPTER IV
METHODS
This chapter discusses the data sources, units of analyses,

variables, and analytical techniques used in this dissertation.

SOURCES
The Office for National Statistics (ONS) and the British
Social Attitudes Survey (BSAS) provided the data for this
dissertation.

Both ONS and BSAS data were differentiated by

local authority code, a geographic distinction common throughout
the U.K. for distinguishing communities.

Both datasets were

also available for the last 30 consecutive years.
In particular, as the largest independent producer of
official statistical data for the U.K. (Statistics 2016), the
ONS is a major clearinghouse for a wide assortment of data
captured at both individual and aggregate levels, and is also
responsible for the decennial census of England and Wales.

The

BSAS is a quantitative study of long-term trends and
perspectives among English and Welsh residents managed through
the National Centre for Social Research since 1983.

Employing a

multi-methods data collection approach (i.e., interpersonal
interviews and self-completed questionnaires), it annually
captures citizens’ attitudes on such issues as national defense,
the economy, and the state of welfare in the region.
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questions address personal beliefs and behaviors along social,
economic, political and moral domains, including a number of
items capturing components of social capital.Variables from the
2001 BSAS were used in this dissertation to capture social
capital; these variables were not available in later iterations
of the survey.

Specifically, there were three times as many

measures of trust in the 2001/2002 BSAS in comparison to the
more recent 2008/2009 iteration of the survey available at the
time of this study.

There were also twice as many measures of

friendship connections when compared to the more recent data
available.
Measures of social capital captured in the BSAS were merged
with aggregate level crime data and covariates from the ONS
using local authority code as the common geographic identifier.
Thus, it was important to ensure ample local authority coverage
in the BSAS sample selected.

Fortunately, the 2001 BSAS sample

encompassed 2,839a respondents distributed across 41% (n=142) of
the 345 local authority areas in England and Wales.
As BSAS respondents were selected through multi-stage
stratified random sampling (Research 2000a), so to then were the
local authority areas in which the respondents resided.
Additional shapefiles for the local authority areas deemed
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
a!Note:

The original BSAS sample was 3,287 respondents. However, after accounting for
missing data and eliminating Scottish respondents (the Scotland BSAS questionnaire
differed considerably from the version provided to England and Wales), the final valid
sample was 2,839. !
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necessary for calculating spatial autocorrelation (see Section
IV - Data Analysis) were acquired via open source Internet
content managed through the University of Edinburgh.

Upon

aggregating the BSAS and ONS data, and performing additional
filtering for missing geographic location data, the final sample
employed for this dissertation was 131 local authority areas
(101 urban areas, with an average of 20 BSAS respondents per
area; 30 rural areas, with an average of 18 respondents per
area).

UNITS OF ANALYSES
The units of analyses in this dissertation was U.K. counties
– a term coined for this study as a means of allowing for more
direct, measurement units comparison with similar U.S.- based
studies. It was derived from the aforementioned local authority
code designations used throughout the U.K.

These codes are a

popular geographic classification and data reporting standard
for official statistical data in the U.K. (Gibson 2008; Pateman
2010/2011).

The counties/codes consist of nine digits

identifying the country and place code of each area they are
assigned to. Such coded areas are roughly the equivalent of
counties in the U.S., as “wards” within local authority areas
are the equivalent of census tracts.

Thus, as U.S counties are

composed of numerous census tracts, so too U.K. counties are
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composed of numerous wards (Pateman 2011).
Admittedly, in studying neighborhood-based theories like
social capital, a spatial definition of neighborhoods that
approximates counties in the U.K. is challenging.

For one

thing, it is solely a material definition in spite of evidence
that residents can and often do define their neighborhoods both
in material and non-material terms (Bell 2007; Bell, Lloyd, and
Vatovec 2010).

A purely spatial, materialistic definition like

U.K. county code thus overlooks the ideational or cultural
aspect of a neighborhood’s profile, the importance of which Bell
(2007) noted in distinguishing “second rurality” from “first
rurality”.

Furthermore, neighborhood literature in the social

sciences often fluctuates between material and non-material
definitions (Bell 2007; Bell, Lloyd, and Vatovec 2010).
Nonetheless, for a number of reasons, it made sense to apply
a spatial definition via the U.K. county codes designation.
First, a spatial definition like U.K. county code is consistent
with the tendency in social science studies of aggregate units
towards materialist notions of neighborhood (Bell, Lloyd, and
Vatovec 2010).

Second, these codes are also a standard that has

traditionally offered distinctions by urbanization, which was
vital attempting to distinguish varying effects of social
capital on crime between urban and rural communities
respectively.

!

Third, county-level aggregation is consist with
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prevailing literature that tests social capital and related
theories using similar units of analysis (Beyerlein and Hipp
2005; Messner, Rosenfeld, and Baumer 2004; Ousey and Lee 2010;
Rosenfeld, Messner, and Baumer 2001), along with several works
showing precedent that neighborhoods and communities can be
approximated via broader macro-level interpretation (Lee and
Ousey 2001; Lee, Thomas, and Ousey 2010; Markowitz, Bellair,
Liska, and Liu 2001; Sampson and Groves 1989).

DEPENDENT VARIABLES
The dependent variables, mean rates of violent and nonviolent crime per thousand residents, were captured from police
recorded crime incidents between 2001 and 2002 supplied by the
Office of National Statistics (ONS).

Forty-three police

agencies, along with the British Transport Police, record all
reported crime in England and Wales.

Though limited only to

crime reported to police officials, and thus poor in estimating
typically underreported crimes like sexual assault, this data
was available for both violent and non-violent crimes, and was
differentiated by U.K. county code (Statistics 2012).
Prior to final preparation and publication via the ONS, the
data was checked for quality on a three month cycle by the Home
Office Statistics Unit.

Additional quality assurance came from

calibration between the notifiable offenses reported and data
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recording standards governed through the Home Office Counting
Rules and the National Crime Recording Standard.

The data were

made available to the public through the Research Development &
Statistics (RDS) Division of the U.K's Home Office – a major
clearinghouse for national crime data in the U.K. – and the RDS
Division's Crime Reduction and Community Safety Group provided
such data across multiple years dating back to 1981.
Confirmatory factor analysis and reliability testing were
used to determine how well ONS crime indicators measured uniform
constructs of violent and non-violent crime.

Specifically, four

indicators were tested for violent crime (violence against the
person, wounding or other act endangering life, other wounding,
and common assault) and eight indicators for non-violent crime
(harassment including penalty notices for disorder, robbery,
theft from the person, criminal damage including arson, burglary
in a dwelling, burglary other than a dwelling, theft of a motor
vehicle, and theft from a motor vehicle).

As per Table 1 below,

both violent and non-violent crime variables showed high
intercorrelation and confirmed the presence of uniform
constructs for both types of crime:

!
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Table 1: Reliability Analysis for Violent and Non-Violent Crime
Measures
Violent Crime
Reliability for 4 Items
Non-Violent Crime
Reliability for 8 Items

Alpha
.825

Standardized Item Alpha
.859

Alpha
.912

Standardized Item Alpha
.938

INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
The main independent variable in this analysis was social
capital.

To measure social capital, there were three key

components made available through the 2001 BSAS: trust,
friendship bonds, and organizational participation.
As per the extant literature, trust is a key component of
social capital.

For this study, trust was initially represented

via mean scores for three composite trust measures.

These were

derived from a series of ordinal inquiries addressing trust in
the government (England and Wales, respectively), and across a
broad spectrum of institutions with respect to whether financial
resources under government purview were being spent in the best
interests of the people (see Appendix A for specific BSAS
variables used).

Factor and reliability analyses (see Table 2)

confirmed a scale fit of all trust measures into one of three
categories – trust in the U.K. government, trust in public
institutions, and trust in private institutions – explaining 64%
total variation:
!
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Table 2: Reliability Analysis for Trust Measures (BSAS)

Reliability Coefficients
for Trust Measures

Alpha
.849

Standardized Item Alpha
.848

Accordingly, mean scores for the three sets of trust variables
were calculated for each BSAS respondent.

Then, the cumulative

average for all such respondents within each U.K. county was
calculated to represent estimates of each dimension of trust in
each county.
Concerning friendship bonds, even the most rudimentary
social capital measure accounts for the volume and density of
friendship networks residents maintain within their communities.
Thus, these bonds were important to include in this study and
were measured through self-reported volume of friends in two
distinct spheres.

Particularly, in order to measure bonding

friendship networks, the following question from the BSAS was
used: “Think now of people who live near you – in your
neighbourhood or district.
friends of yours?”

How many of these people are close

In order to measure bridging friendship

networks, the following BSAS question was used: “How many other
close friends do you have – apart from those at work, in your
neighbourhood, or family members? Think, for instance, of
friends at clubs, church, or the like.”

The number of friends

reported in response to both questions was aggregated, with the
!
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cumulative average taken to represent extent of bridging and
bonding friendships networks in each U.K. county.
Membership and involvement in social organizations is a
third well-recognized component of social capital.

As scholars

like Putnam argued, organizational activity typically results
from a sense of belongingness and obligation to the community
with which one affiliates (Putnam 1995; Putnam 2000; White
2006).

However, organizational membership alone does not

capture social capital; one could very well be a member of
several organizations, but attend few meetings and/or avoid
service to these institutions.

Fortunately, BSAS variables

under this construct reflected both the type and mean frequency
of respondents' involvement across a variety of organizations
within the last 12 months prior to survey respondents’
participation (see Appendix B for specific BSAS variables used).
As illustrated in Table 3, and similar to the crime and
trust measures, there was confirmation of construct uniformity
and a significant scale fit between all seven organizational
participation items:

Table 3: Reliability Analysis for Organizational Participation
Measures (BSAS)
Reliability for
Organizational
Participation Measures

!

Alpha
.576

Standardized Item Alpha
.598
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Accordingly, one composite variable explaining 44% of data
variation was distinguished from these items.

Aggregate mean

scores for each participation variable were calculated for each
BSAS respondent.

Then, the average respondent scores within

each U.K. county was calculated to represent the community
average for organizational participation in each county.

ADDITIONAL COVARIATES
In addition to the dependent and independent variables, a
number of structural covariates and controls were incorporated
into this study to determine the effect of social capital on
correlations between such variables and U.K. crime rates.
Specifically, concentrated disadvantage, residential stability,
and ethnic diversity are all variables related to urbanization
status, crime and social capital in residential communities.
Therefore, by accounting for these variables in the crime models
estimated, it could be determined if social capital mediated,
moderated, or held no influence on crime rates when such
covariates were accounted for.

These variables were provided

through the 2001 U.K. Census, and made available through the
ONS.
Concentrated disadvantage for England and Wales was measured
via deprivation indices calculated by Oxford University on
behalf of the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister, and the Welsh
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Office and Welsh Local Government Association respectively.
Both were derived from the 2001 U.K. Census, which is the last
cycle for which complete data is currently accessible.

These

indices offered a more robust conceptualization of disadvantage
than income poverty alone by accounting for additional resource
and opportunity deficiencies in employment/employable skills,
health, education, job training, housing, access to social
services, living environment and crime prevention measures
reported in each U.K. county area.
Residential stability was captured via two measures – rate
of population turnover per thousand residents and percent of
homeowners – recorded in the 2001 U.K. Census for England and
Wales.

Ethnic diversity was derived from the percentage of

respondents in each U.K. county recorded as being non-White
and/or non-British.

As with information for residential

stability, ethnic diversity data is captured through the 2001
U.K. Census.
As a control for the two different countries represented in
the data, country identification was represented through the
dichotomous coding of England and Wales, where England was coded
“1” and Wales as “0”.

While there was no specific theoretical

literature specifying that relationships between crime and
social capital should vary between the two countries, England
and Wales did vary considerably by the crime and structural
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measures in this study.

Thus, the distinction of the two

countries was included in the hypothesized models to determine
if any model variation could be attributed to this factor, and
if the affect of country identification varied once social
capital was included.
In order to measure urbanization level, the ONS provided an
ordinal scale differentiating urban/rural community status and
population density (Agency 2005; Pateman 2010/2011). This scale
built upon the ONS’ Urban 50/Rural 50 scale, but added a clearer
definition of population density in each category (Bibby and
Shepard 2004; Pateman 2010/2011):
6 = Urban – Less Sparse
5 = Urban – Sparse
4 = Town & Fringe – Less Sparse
3 = Town & Fringes – Sparse
2 = Village, Hamlet & Isolated Dwellings – Less Sparse
1 = Village, Hamlet, Isolated Dwellings – Sparse
For this study, as per notes from Bibby and Shepard (2004), the
scale above was dichotomized; categories 1 through 4 were
treated as rural and coded as “2”, while 5 and 6 were labeled
“urban” and coded as “1”.

Thus, all U.K. counties in this study

were classified into one of the two categories.
Additionally, given the relevance of both spatial and nonspatial attributes in defining neighborhoods, this sparsity-

!

!

103

derived dichotomy was compared with BSAS respondents’ selfdescriptions of the places they live.

BSAS respondents further

had the option of describing their neighborhoods as urban (i.e.,
“big cities”, “small cities/towns”) or rural (i.e. “country
villages”, “farm/country homes”); suburbs were excluded from the
analysis.
When compared to the self-identified BSAS data for
neighborhood type, the ONS-derived definition is slightly more
conservative for urban and considerably more so for rural.
Respondents in the BSAS data indicated 124 urban areas and 66
rural.

However, the BSAS definitions also contained some

overlap wherein certain respondents within the same U.K. county
fluctuated between defining the county as urban and rural.
Thus, for the purpose of maintaining mutual exclusivity, this
study applied the spatial dichotomized definition of urban and
rural derived from ONS data.
Finally, in addition to these measures, a test for spatial
autocorrelation was performed to determine if contiguous
counties exhibited greater similarity for any of the crime
variables, and thus would require additional data weighting in
any models tested.

By and large, studies of spatial areas

reveal such areas in close proximity tend to exhibit greater
similarities than those further in distance (Rookey 2012; Tobler
1970).

!

Particularly, in studies of both crime and social
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capital, there is some precedence for spatial autocorrelation
occurring when these concepts are studied at aggregate levels
given that neighboring communities tend to exhibit similar
structural and behavioral trends (Scribner, Theall, GhoshDastidar, Mason, Cohen, and Simonsen 2007; Socia and Stamatel
2012; Takagi, Ikeda, and Kawachi 2012). Accordingly, it stood to
reason that such correlation needed to be investigated, and
managed if present, in order to avoid data inaccuracies and
overall weaker analytical strength (Rookey 2012) in this study.
Moran’s I – a common method used for illustrating spatial
autocorrelation (Anselin 2005; Gunaratna, Liu, and Park) –
revealed the following:
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Table 4: Moran’s I Estimates of ONS Crime Rates for U.K.
Counties (N = 131)
Violent Offenses

Moran’s I (sig)

Violence against person

.234 (.01)

Wounding/
other life-endangering act

.188(.04)

Other wounding
Common assault

.165 (.02)
.233 (.03)

Non-violent Offenses
Harassment
Robbery
Theft from the person

.207 (.02)
.330 (.01)
.200 (.01)

Criminal damage (e.g., arson)

.187 (.01)

Burglary (in dwelling)

.301 (.01)

Burglary (other)
Theft of motor vehicle

.260 (.01)
.394 (.01)

Theft from motor vehicle

.300 (.01)

As per Table 4, there were varying degrees of autocorrelation
with certain counties for violent and non-violent crime rate
estimates.

Thus, additional weighting variables were

incorporated into the path and regression models developed for
this research.

DATA ANALYSIS
Data analysis in this dissertation entailed a combination of
structural equation modeling (SEM) to test Hypotheses #1 and #3,
and ordinary least squares (OLS) regression to test Hypothesis
#2.

!

Support for combining SEM and OLS multivariate regression
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in this way can be found in similar macro-level research by
Smith and Damphousse (1998).

Given that SEM represents an

effort to impose models upon existing data, OLS regression
analyses also served as means to determining the models that the
data did support in instances where the imposed SEM models fell
short.

Structural Equation Modeling (SEM)
Model estimates generated via structural equation modeling
(SEM) featured prominently throughout this study.

SEM allows

for testing of the equivalence of measurement components and
structural models alike for different samples of a population
(Byrne 2010).

It has become especially popular in the last 20

years given its ability to detect direct, indirect, and total
effects of variables on one another by allowing dependent
variables in one equation to serve as explanatory independent
variables in another (Liu, Wang, and Tao 2013; Smith and
Damphousse 1998).

A few studies even offer precedence that SEM

can be a valuable technique in modeling crime estimates with
aggregate U.K. data when respondents per sample unit are small
(Kaylen and Pridemore 2013; Markowitz, Bellair, Liska, and Liu
2001), such as is the case in this dissertation.
Hypothesis 1 was tested by running two six-factor recursive
measurement models – one for urban U.K. counties and one for

!

!

107

rural – where a single latent measure of social capital was
estimated.

The models consisted of three composite variables

for trust, two for friendship bonds (one for bonding, one for
bridging), and one for organizational participation as
illustrated in Figure 2:

Figure 2: Model for Social Capital (Estimated Simultaneously for
Urban and Rural U.K. Counties)

Results from these path models determined the composition of the
social capital composite measures to be used in later stages of
SEM analysis.
In order to address Hypothesis 2, multivariate linear
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regression coefficients were estimated between concentrated
disadvantage, residential stability, ethnic diversity, country
identification and observed composite measures of crime rate
while controlling for spatial autocorrelation for both urban and
rural U.K. counties.

In order to address the third hypothesis,

full structural models for violent and non-violent crime rate
were estimated using composite measures of social capital
distinguished by urbanization, and incorporating the structural
covariates (see Figures 3 & 4):

Figure 3: Full Structural Model for Social Capital and Violent
Crime Rate (Estimated Simultaneously for Urban and Rural U.K.
Counties)
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Figure 4: Full Structural Model for Social Capital and NonViolent Crime Rate (Estimated Simultaneously for Urban and Rural
U.K. Counties)

This dissertation proposed that each SEM model estimated would
reject the null hypothesis of group equivalence.

Thus, the

argument of group variance between model estimates for urban and
rural U.K. county samples would be supported.

!
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CHAPTER V
FINDINGS
This dissertation builds upon the work of Pierre Bourdieu,

James Coleman and Robert Putnam by both confirming that social
capital is multidimensional, and that it is both influenced and
influenced by a variety of social constructs.

With respect to

crime, numerous scholars have demonstrated the relevance of
social capital as a factor in developing predictive community
crime models.

However, as findings from this study illustrated,

social capital does not affect all crimes the same in all
communities.

In fact, at minimum this study offers support that

the influence of social capital is largely a matter of which
crimes are being considered, and whether or not the community is
urban or rural.
In this chapter, results and implications from tests of all
three hypotheses are discussed.

Path models and goodness of fit

indices are presented and explored, along with relevant OLS
regression tables.

For all variables exceeding normality

parameters, the base-10 logarithm used.

DESCRIPTIVES OF URBAN AND RURAL COMMUNITIES
Consistent with the community-based literature on criminal
offending and structural demographics, U.K. crime rates in this
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study (see Table 5) were generally higher in urban communities,
as was deprivation level and ethnic diversity:

Table 5: Variable Summary (All, Urban and Rural)
All
(N = 131)
DEPENDENT VARIABLES –
Violent Crimes

Mean

Violence against Person
Wounding/Other Act
Endangering Life
Other Wounding
Common Assault
Overall Violent Crime

11.81

6.97

0.30

Non-Violent Crimes
Harassment
Robbery
Theft from Person
Criminal Damage
(incl Arson)
Burglary in Dwelling
Burglary Other than
Dwelling
Theft of a Motor Vehicle
Theft from a Motor
Vehicle
Overall Non-Violent
Crime
COVARIATES
Deprivation Level
Ethnic Diversity
Homeownership
Pop. Turnover Rate

SD

Urban
(N= 101)
Mean

Rural
(N = 30)

SD

Mean

SD

13.21

7.24

7.08

2.71

0.30

0.36

0.31

0.12

0.10

3.89
4.13
20.14

2.43
3.42
12.05

4.43
4.55
22.56

2.49
3.70
12.53

2.08
2.69
11.97

0.81
1.54
4.51

2.08
1.97
2.18

1.40
2.79
5.09

2.29
2.46
2.69

1.48
3.01
5.71

1.40
0.33
0.49

0.82
0.34
0.38

19.75

7.61

21.86

7.27

12.66

3.20

7.61

5.00

8.83

5.03

3.50

1.43

8.24

4.15

8.87

4.31

6.12

2.66

5.87

3.94

6.86

3.91

2.53

1.37

12.38

6.88

13.92

6.85

7.23

3.82

60.09

29.65

67.76

29.07

34.26

11.53

23775
0.12
0.70
6.10

8502
0.14
0.10
5.03

25295
0.14
0.69
5.62

8191
0.15
0.11
4.97

18655
0.05
0.76
7.71

7585
0.03
0.03
4.96

Conversely, homeownership and residential turnover tended to be
higher in rural settings. Concerning homeownership, this
observation is consistent with past U.K. Census data reporting
higher numbers of residents with owner-occupied status in rural
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communities (Joshi, Dodgeon, and Hughes 2005; Joshi, Hughes, and
Dodgeon 2006).
As for residential turnover, while higher turnover in rural
areas might initially be surprising in light of historical
trends showing urban residents are comparatively more transient
(Dennett and Stillwell 2008), the contradictory evidence is not
without some precedent.

In fact, for the 2001 census year

represented in this dissertation, demographic profiles of
England and Wales revealed rural communities had higher
population turnover that urban communities (Joshi, Dodgeon, and
Hughes 2005; Joshi, Hughes, and Dodgeon 2006).

This was

especially noticeable after controlling for international
immigration, which makes up a larger amount of the turnover
occurring in urban areas (Joshi, Dodgeon, and Hughes 2005).
The life course transition of young U.K. residents –
especially aged 20-29 – offers some explanation.

For much of

the internal migration that contributes to higher turnover in
rural communities, the 20-something cohort tends to be more apt
to leave their own families to start families of their own
(Joshi, Dodgeon, and Hughes 2005).

Amongst these young people,

the more frequent pattern seems to be rural young people leaving
to settle in urban areas.

!
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TESTING HYPOTHESIS #1
With respect to components of social capital, urban and
rural communities were remarkably similar.

Table 6 illustrates

that mean estimates of trust, friendship, and organizational
participation were nearly identical for both urban and rural
U.K. counties:

Table 6: Variable Summary – Social Capital (All, Urban and
Rural)
All (N = 131)

SOCIAL CAPITAL
Social Trust –
Public
Social Trust –
Private
Bonding Friendships
Bridging Friendships
Organizational
Participation

Urban (N= 101)

Rural (N = 30)

Mean

SD

Mean

SD

Mean

SD

2.6

0.2

2.6

0.2

2.5

0.2

2.8

0.2

2.7

0.2

2.8

0.2

1.4
2.3

0.7
1.4

1.4
2.3

0.7
1.4

1.4
2.2

0.6
1.3

1.6

0.4

1.6

0.4

1.7

0.4

However, SEM estimates revealed important nuances between urban
and rural settings concerning how these components contribute to
a composite model of social capital.

For instance, while the

proposed model produced path coefficients for the urban sample,
it initially failed to run for rural U.K. counties. Exploratory
factor analysis revealed that the variable associated with
“trust in government” was accountable for this initial failure
of the rural model.
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Results for Hypothesis #1
Once omitted, coefficients for the rural model were
successfully produced as well:

Figure 5: Estimates for Hypothesized Path Model of Social
Capital (Urban Communities)
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Figure 6: Estimates for Hypothesized Path Model of Social
Capital (Rural Communities)

In both urban (see Figure 5) and rural (see Figure 6) versions
of the model, organizational participation had a positive effect
on social capital.

This conformed with prevailing literature

citing the relevance of membership and participation in formal
community organizations as an important component of social
capital.

However, the effect was noticeably stronger in urban

communities versus rural.
Though supporting literature on this finding specific to the
U.K. is lacking, the stronger effects of organizational
participation on urban social capital versus rural social
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capital is not entirely absent of precedent or rationale.

When

compared to rural settlements, residents of urban and semi-urban
communities in Nicaragua have displayed a higher propensity for
reported affiliations with political parties and credit
associations (Mitchell and Bossert 2007).

Amidst their cache of

social capital, rural migrant workers in China tend to refrain
from including participation in urban organizations; reasons
cited range from simple preference for social connections
already established in their villages of origin to status
marginalization in urban communities serving as obstruction from
such participation (Palmer, Perkins, and Xu 2011).
Concerning friendship connections, both bridging and bonding
friendship networks were also shown to be positive correlates
with social capital in urban counties. Again, the literature
offers support here.

Scholars like Jane Jacobs (1961) have been

quick to highlight the importance of friendships via contact
opportunities in urban settings as an important precondition to
social capital.

In urban neighborhoods, noted for their higher

population counts and diversity, it is not uncommon for
residents to manage a large collection of friends and casual
acquaintances towards various ends. Additionally, it may be that
the pressures of urban living spotlighted by Durkheim, Wirth and
others cause one to more aggressively seek out and maintain a
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broader spectrum of primary and secondary friendship
connections.
On the other hand, friendship connections contributed very
little to social capital in the rural U.K. communities.

Thus,

with respect to friendships, this supports the hypothesis that
social capital is not conceptually the same between urban and
rural communities.

One likely explanation for this difference

between urban and rural social capital concerns the densitybased measurement of friendship networks in the BSAS.
Consider that a feature of living in dense, urban U.K.
settings is that social interactions are more likely to occur
with a broader range of individuals due to lower spatial
proximity and diversified travel options.

This is especially

true of elderly city dwellers who are often less susceptible to
the social isolation experienced by their demographic peers in
more rural communities (Drennan, Treacy, Butler, Byrne, Fealy,
Frazer, and Irving 2008). Accordingly, the opportunities to
build a broader network of friends are more plentiful in urban
settings due to higher propensity for contact and structure
features allowing for it versus rural areas.
Another possible explanation is that in more sparsely
populated rural settings, while fewer friendship encounters
occur, fewer friendships also need to be maintained in the
cultivation of social capital.

!

Mind you – this should not be
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taken to mean that rural residents have less meaningful
friendship bonds than their urban counterparts.

Rather, it just

may be that in conceptualizing social capital, a measurement of
social capital via friendship network volume or density would be
less appropriate for rural settings.
Finally, turning to trust measures, results here again
support the prediction that social capital is different across
urban and rural areas.
positive effects.

For both types of communities, trust had

This was consistent with prevailing research

that social capital tends to be higher in communities where
residents express more trust.
However, trust measures were more significant in the rural
model of social capital.

Due to the spatial remoteness

commensurate with many rural communities, trust – particularly
that which develops through face-to-face interactions – is a
major foundational element towards the realization of social
capital (Townsend, Wallace, Smart, and Norman 2016). As for
urban settings, it may be that a different kind of trust –
perhaps one centered less around generalized trust in
institutions and more akin with a personalized, context-specific
trust in individuals and/or establishments – resonates more with
the sort of social capital fostered in urban settings.
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Jacobs implied as much when describing the custom among

local residents in her Greenwich Village community of leaving
their keys with trusted local business owners:
In our family, for example, when a friend wants to use our
place while we are away for a weekend or everyone happens
to be out during the day… we tell such a friend that he can
pick up the key at the delicatessen across the street. Joe
Cornacchia, who keeps the delicatessen, usually has a dozen
or so keys at a time for handing out like this.
Now why do I, and many others, select Joe as a logical
custodian for keys? Because we trust him, first, to be a
responsible custodian, but equally important because we
know that he combines a feeling of good will with a feeling
of no personal responsibility about our private affairs.
Joe considers it no concern of his whom we choose to permit
in our places and why. (Jacobs 1961:60)
In this way, residents capitalize upon a constant source of
nuanced social capital fostered with local businesses by way of
continued guardianship over their property during extended time
spent away from their residences.

TESTING HYPOTHESES #2 & #3
The next steps – testing the similarity of structural
effects on crime for urban and rural communities (Hypothesis
#2), and whether social capital affects crime negatively after
controlling for these structural effects (Hypothesis #3) –
entailed developing a full SEM model.

Doing so required

accounting for the finding that social capital, as measured by
trust, friendships, and organizational participation, was not
the same in urban and rural communities.

!

As a result of this
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finding, one uniform measure of social capital was created for
urban communities by summing the mean estimates of trust,
friendship and organizational participation measures into a
rudimentary index score.

The resulting index represented an

approximation of each respective urban counties aggregate level
of social capital investment as reflected by BSAS respondents
within those counties.
For rural social capital, one construct measure was created
using the composite measures for trust and organizational
participation.

As with urban settings, the sum of mean

estimates for the composite variables created an index score as
a valuation of each counties social capital.

Friendship

connections were omitted from the rural formula due to their
aforementioned relative insignificance in a latent social
capital model.

Results for Hypothesis #2
As per Tables 7 & 8, results here contradicted the
hypothesis that ethnic heterogeneity, concentrated disadvantage
and residential stability demonstrated similar effects on models
of community crime.

Specifically, the structural variables

identified resulted in statistically significant models of
violent and non-violent crime in urban areas of the U.K.
However, this was not so with rural communities:
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Table 7: Summary of Regression Coefficients for Urban Crime
Models

Violent Crimes*
Pop. Turnover Rate
% of Home Own.
Ethnicity
Deprivation Index
Country
Autocorrelation
Non-Violent Crimes**
Pop. Turnover Rate
% of Home Own.
Ethnicity
Deprivation Index
Country
Autocorrelation

Beta

Sig
(p-value)

.086
-.247
.396
.788
-.838
-.003

.175
.004
<.001
<.001
<.001
.964

-.023
-.240
.234
1.142
-1.041
.156

.654
<.001
<.001
<.001
<.001
.003

*% of variation explained: 64%; p < .001
**% of variation explained: 76%; p < .001

Table 8: Summary of Regression Coefficients for Rural Crime
Models

Violent Crimes*
Pop. Turnover Rate
% of Home Own.
Ethnicity
Deprivation Index
Country
Autocorrelation
Non-Violent Crimes**
Pop. Turnover Rate
% of Home Own.
Ethnicity
Deprivation Index
Country
Autocorrelation

Beta

Sig
(p-value)

-.136
-.129
.020
1.192
-1.282
-.067

.476
.447
.915
<.001
<.001
.646

-.091
.084
.304
1.039
-.677
.112

.672
.685
.175
.003
.079
.511

*% of variation explained: 49%; p = .001
**% of variation explained: 30%; p = .025
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While the limited sample size of rural counties warrants

some caution in interpreting these results, it was clear
nonetheless that only a deprivation-based model was significant
in the rural settings.

The scarcity here of significant

covariates for rural crime models may lie in the nature of rural
living versus life in urban settings.

It could be argued that

the covariates in this study represented social forces found in
a body of literature where urban crime is more commonly
predicted.

Thus, a poor fit to rural crime could be expected

and it may be that predicting rural activity in U.K. crime
demands shifting attention to a set of structural factors more
befitting of less urbanized communities.
Additionally, it is important to acknowledge that
concentrated disadvantage held significance in crime models for
both community types.

Poverty is a problem commonplace to both

urban and rural communities throughout the U.K. (Layte, Nolan,
and Whelan 2000; Leonard 2013; Pacione 2004).

Concerning the

connection between criminal behavior and economic disadvantage,
Leonard (2013) observed how Ireland’s historical failures to
address the needs of its poorest population segments has
routinely resulted in various transgressions from some of these
same impoverished subgroups.
the U.K.

!

It is paradigm common throughout
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More often than not, the debilitating effects of income and

resource poverty serve as stimulus for criminal activity in the
U.K. irrespective of urbanization level.

In addition, the

significance of the disadvantage variable in this study may
imply the importance of the measure’s comprehensiveness.

That

is to say, while such disparity was experienced at considerably
higher levels in urban communities, the robustness of the
measure seemed to tap into enough dimensions of disadvantage
relevant to both urban and rural settings with respect to crime
rates.

Results for Hypothesis #3
Estimating a full structural model of violent and nonviolent crime in urban U.K. counties, with the aforementioned
controls for spatial autocorrelation and urbanization
distinction, suggested a weak and negative association between
social capital and crime:
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Figure 7: Estimates for a Full Structural Model of Violent Urban
Crime Rates

!
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Figure 8: Estimates for a Full Structural Model of Non-Violent
Urban Crime Rates

However, closer inspection of the model through OLS regression
revealed the proposed model is not supported.

Social capital

did not hold any influence over U.K. crime rates independent of
the other structural factors.

As per Table 9, the introduction

of social capital changed very little about how the crime models
functioned in urban settings:

!

!

126

Table 9: Summary of Regression for Urban Crime Models (with
Social Capital)
Original
Model*
Beta
Violent Crimes
Pop. Turnover Rate
% of Home Own.
Ethnicity
Deprivation Index
Country
Autocorrelation
Social Capital

Sig.
(p-value)

.086
-.247
.396
.788
-.838
-.003
N/A

.175
.004
<.001
<.001
<.001
.964
N/A

Model w/
Social Capital**
Beta

Sig.
(p-value)

.088
-.247
.396
.790
-.839
-.004
.009

.176
.004
<.001
<.001
<.001
.955
.883

-.012
-.241
.237
1.161
-1.061
.147
.064

.821
<.001
<.001
<.001
<.001
.004
.205

*% of variation explained: 64%; p < .001
**% of variation explained: 63%; p < .001

Non-Violent Crimes
Pop. Turnover Rate
% of Home Own.
Ethnicity
Deprivation Index
Country
Autocorrelation
Social Capital

-.023
-.240
.234
1.142
-1.041
.156
N/A

.654
<.001
<.001
<.001
<.001
.003
N/A

*% of variation explained: 76%; p < .001
**% of variation explained: 76%; p < .001

While there was evidence of statistically significant models
for both crime types, neither of those models seemed impacted by
social capital.

This contradicted much of the extant

literature, but did support the premise that social capital is a
force that needs to be weighed against a number of contextual
variables in determining if and how it impacts U.K. crime.
By comparison, in rural communities, estimates from the
proposed model implied social capital had a somewhat more
significant effect on violent crime rates, but remained
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insignificant for rates of non-violent crime:

Figure 9: Estimates for a Full Structural Model of Violent Rural
Crime Rates and Social Capital
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Figure 10: Estimates for a Full Structural Model of Non-Violent
Rural Crime Rates and Social Capital

Yet again, OLS regression offers clarity here.

While the urban

data revealed a variety of effects of structural factors on
crime, nearly all of those same factors were insignificant to
rural county crime (see Table 10).

The lone exception, level of

deprivation, served to accentuate the premise that poverty has
an enduring effect on crime no matter an area’s extent of
urbanization:
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Table 10: Summary of Regression for Rural Crime Models (with
Social Capital)
Original
Model*

Violent Crimes
Pop. Turnover Rate
% of Home Own.
Ethnicity
Deprivation Index
Country
Autocorrelation
Social Capital

Model w/
Social Capital**

Beta

Sig.
(p-value)

Beta

Sig.
(p-value)

-.136
-.129
.020
1.192
-1.282
-.067
N/A

.476
.447
.915
<.001
<.001
.646
N/A

-.123
-.098
.020
1.368
-1.455
-.078
.161

.523
.570
.913
<.001
<.001
.595
.342

.672
.685
.175
.003
.079
.511
N/A

-.052
.167
.313
1.441
-1.082
.155
.356

.801
.411
.142
.001
.015
.344
.068

*% of variation explained: 49%; p = .001
**% of variation explained: 49%; p = .002

Non-Violent Crimes
Pop. Turnover Rate
% of Home Own.
Ethnicity
Deprivation Index
Country
Autocorrelation
Social Capital

-.091
.084
.304
1.039
-.677
.112
N/A

*% of variation explained: 30%; p = .025
**% of variation explained: 37%; p = .012

Moreover, goodness-of-fit estimates for the proposed models (see
Table 11) further supported the conclusion that the initial
models were of poor fit to urban and rural crime:

!

!

130

Table 11: Goodness of Fit (Full Models of Crime and Social
Capital; Urban vs. Rural)
Urban
(N= 101)
GOODNESS OF FIT

Rural
(N = 30)

Viol Crime

Non-Viol
Crime

Viol Crime

Non-Viol
Crime

Overall chi-square
Degrees of freedom
Chi-square significance
Number of parameters
Root mean square residual
Goodness-of-Fit Index
Adjusted Goodness-of-Fit
Index

109.57
7
<.001
29
82.73
.855
.254

155.5
7
<.001
29
91.5
.831
.131

33.137
7
<.001
29
6.77
.836
.156

29.56
7
<.001
29
93.71
.849
.225

Parsimony Goodness-of-Fit
Index
Root mean square error of
approximation

.166

.162

.163

.165

.383

.461

.359

.333

Scholars like Byrne (2006) have noted a well-fitting
hypothesized model via chi-square testing is not that common.
Rather, researchers typically see chi-square statistics
substantially larger than degrees of freedom and low
probabilities indicating a need to modify the model variables
and/or increase sample size towards a better fitting model.

As

forementioned, this dissertation excluded slightly more than
half of the counties existing in England and Wales between 2000
and 2001; it is reasonable to assume that more favorable chisquare estimates could have been produced if more counties were
available for analysis.
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RMSEA calculations also indicated the proposed model’s fit

with both community types was less than ideal, with estimates
exceeding .10 for all datasets, whereas lower than .05 would be
have been ideal.

However, Byrne (2006) again revealed that

RMSEA can tend to “overreject” models when sample sizes are
small.

Given what we know about counties that had to be

excluded from this analysis, it may be plausible that a greater
sample size would have resulted in more favorable RMSEA
estimates.
Less stringent tests of model fit would seem more
appropriate for this data.

However, even then, most of the

results in this study indicated a poor fitting model; only the
GFI calculation indicated the model fit U.K. crime data
reasonably well.

Thus, the third hypothesis was rejected and an

important question presented itself: exactly what kind of
model(s) do support the data?

Hypothesis #3 Results by Type of Crime
Though overall violent and non-violent crime rates were the
focus of this dissertation, studies of social capital and crime
have found significant models in instances when specific types
of crime were differentiated.

Noteworthy here is the work

Messner and Rosenfeld have pioneered in isolating the effects of
social capital on homicide (Messner, Rosenfeld, and Baumer 2004;
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Rosenfeld, Messner, and Baumer 2001).

As such, while the third

hypothesis test failed to show social capital as a significant
factor in models of overall U.K. crime rates, there was reason
to believe that social capital might fare better for models of
specific crime types.
As it turned out, there indeed was no one overall model for
violent or non-violent crime that was significant.

Rather, as

presented in Tables 12 – 14, supplemental analysis via
multivariate OLS regression revealed a few different models
where particular types of social capital significantly
contributed to predictive models of U.K. crime rates – each
model variant by type of crime and community:

Table 12: Summary of Regression Coefficients for Urban Models of
Harassment*

Pop. Turnover Rate
% of Home Own.
Ethnicity
Deprivation Index
Country
Autocorrelation
Social Capital

Beta

Sig.

.125
-.205
.358
.590
-.922
-.006
.140

.095
.036
<.001
<.001
<.001
.935
.054

*% of variation explained: 51%; p < .001
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Table 13: Summary of Regression Coefficients for Urban Models of
Burglary/Dwelling*

Pop. Turnover Rate
% of Home Own.
Ethnicity
Deprivation Index
Country
Autocorrelation
Social Capital

Beta

Sig.

-.035
-.113
.330
1.171
-.898
-.139
.138

.557
.142
<.001
<.001
<.001
.021
.018

*% of variation explained: 69%; p < .001

Table 14: Summary of Regression Coefficients for Rural Models of
Motor Vehicle Theft*

Pop. Turnover Rate
% of Home Own.
Ethnicity
Deprivation Index
Country
Autocorrelation
Social Capital

Beta

Sig.

-.067
.326
.564
1.352
-1.123
.094
.508

.684
.055
.003
<.001
.003
.478
.003

*% of variation explained: 59%; p < .001

The emergence of these models might explain why the
initially proposed structural models for testing Hypothesis #3
fit so poorly.

Those models were derived from assumptions of

only two singular social capital pathways to comprehending
overall crime rates varying by urbanization level.

In fact, the

Hypothesis #3 output suggested a few different models, and each
nuanced by crime type and urbanization.
For example, two models revealed that social capital is
significant and positively correlated with the rate of

!
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harassment (b = .140; p = .05) and home burglaries (b = .138; p
= .018) that occur in urban areas.

Particularly when such

crimes occur with high frequency in the community, and when the
community features high levels of mistrust and spatially
segmentation – common traits of large, densely populated city
settings in the U.K. – it has been observed that efforts to
control crimes like harassment and burglary will tend to suffer
(Hope 2001).

Within such communities, it is possible for

residents to retain close contact with their neighbors (thus,
displaying one type of social capital) while simultaneously
failing to generate the type of social capital that would aid in
implanting social control over these crimes (Hope 2001; Skogan
1990).
Importantly though, the positive effects of social capital
here were small.

There is also scant empirical support for

social capital effects on specific crimes like harassment and
home burglary in the extant urban literature.

Thus, there is

cause to question the strength of the effect illustrated here,
along with the rationale for why only these crimes would be
influenced by social capital in urban English and Welsh
settlements but not in rural.
For the rural counties, a model of vehicular theft was the
sole instance where social capital was of some significance (b =
.508; p = .003).

!

However, the effect of social capital here was
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positive, relatively strong and thus worthy of some
consideration.

One plausible explanation for social capital’s

positive effect in this model may lie in the perceptual
idiosyncrasies of rural communities versus urban settings with
respect to theft security.
In rural settings, where camaraderie through reciprocal
friendships, social trust, and community inclusiveness is
commonplace, it would not be unusual to find social capital
(particularly, bonding social capital) in abundance.

Just the

same, these rural qualities might lend to rural residents
becoming too trusting of the security of their surroundings such
that they become more susceptible to certain crimes like vehicle
theft.

Note the recent data and subsequent warnings from major

rural insurance providers like NFU Mutual that prospective
thieves are known to spy on the lifestyles of rural residents in
order to find ideal opportunities for all manner of theft
(Mutual 2015).
From its 2012 Rural Crime Survey, NFU Mutual determined
theft of and from rural properties to be largely a matter of
advanced planning and exploitation of opportunities where
surveillance and safeguards of these properties are minimal
(Mutual 2015).

A prime opportunity to execute an automotive

theft would be when farmers take lunch breaks during the day and
are prone to leave their tractors or other farm vehicles
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unattended for what they perceive to be too short a period of
time for such theft to occur.

Such theft is also known to occur

during known periods when rural residents leave their vehicles
and similar possessions unattended for extended periods of time
(e.g., during “tea” times or end-of-week excursions into town),
and police response times are anticipated to be slower (Mutual
2015).
Insurance data aside, there is little prior evidence from
rural U.K. settings explaining why vehicular theft models would
be so strongly affected by social capital, and the positive
coefficient calculated does contradict much of the extant
literature extolling negative relationships between social
capital and crime.

Nonetheless, irrespective of urbanization

level, a positive correlation between social capital itself
and/or components of it and various forms of criminal and/or
deviant activity is not entirely unprecedented.
Certain delinquent peer groups (i.e., adolescent alcohol
drinkers) have shown that their delinquency can serve as a key
cohesive element lending to the group’s existence (Kreager,
Rulison, and Moody 2011).

This work is further supported with

evidence across multiple countries of social capital’s pivotal
role in the establishment and sustenance of organized crime
syndicates (Koppen 2013; Lo 2010; Steffensmeier and Ulmer 2006).
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Carson (2004) noted how social capital by way of strong

social ties could be associated with higher crime and diminished
informal social control in a community.

In such settings,

albeit typically urban, social ties that are geographically
restricted can contribute to crime by discouraging collective
responses to local community problems (Carson 2004; Morenoff,
Sampson, and Raudenbush 2001).

This, again, would serve to

explain the positive association between specific crimes like
vehicular theft and social capital in rural U.K. areas.
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CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSION
As findings from this study suggested, social capital in the

UK is not the same construct once urban and rural communities
are distinguished from each other.

It was also clear that

structural variables known to influence UK crime rates vary in
their effects due in part to a community’s urbanization level.
Finally, this dissertation demonstrated that social capital’s
effects on such rates are rather limited and warrant
specification in the type of crime being measured along with
urbanization level.

While these findings from the study were

clear, some limitations throughout the project should be
recognized.

LIMITATIONS
First, in moving forward with research of this nature,
significant efforts could be made to address a number of factors
impacting the precision of the models proposed in this study.
Concerning one such factor, sample size, certain constraints
documented earlier in this dissertation resulted in only
communities in England and Wales being studied, and only those
with residents who had at least 10 respondents complete the 2001
BSAS study.

This made for a less comprehensive analysis of both

the two countries and of the U.K. as a whole.

!
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limitations were understood in advance and unavoidable, they
nonetheless serve as key points of areas for improvement.

A

greater sampling of counties – especially rural – would likely
improve both the explained variance of data for the derived
models and the strength of tests for spatial autocorrelation.
A second possible improvement would be to address the
limited degrees of freedom in this study’s SEM models by
developing a more sophisticated structural model.

While

residential stability, ethnic heterogeneity and concentrated
disadvantage are among the more common covariates influencing
crime rates in U.K., additional variables are likely relevant.
This is notable in light of the scarcity in variables that were
statistically significant for rural crime rate models.
Identifying more relevant structural covariates to crime in
rural settings would almost certainly improve the estimation of
social capital effects on crime.
Thirdly, the difficulty in measuring social capital in this
study is not to be overlooked.

While social capital literature

generally supports using measurements for trust, friendship
networks, and organizational participation, the BSAS instrument
revealed some specific limitations that altered analytical
strength in this research. In particular, a more robust,
qualitative measurement of friendship measures apropos for
assessing rural residents, as well as alternative definitions of
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trust for urban dwellers, might prove well in determining a
clearer measurement of social capital.
Limitations notwithstanding, there appears to be enough
evidence to suggest that there are applicable models of crime in
the U.K. that incorporate social capital, and that those models
vary based upon the urbanization level of a community and the
type of crime rate in question.

However, failure to fit a

proposed model of overall violent and non-violent crime rate to
this data serves as both a caution against abiding too rigidly
to preexisting notions of social capital-crime paradigms, and
confirmation that further international scholarship in this area
is warranted.

While some of this dissertation’s results may be

attributable to methodological limitations, there is enough
evidence to warrant future research in the U.K. and abroad
towards building better crime models within the discourse of
social capital.

FUTURE RESEARCH
Amidst the current context of social science discourse,
heightened awareness of place dynamics and “communitymindedness” is undeniable.

As Sampson notes:

Community has been prescribed for much of what allegedly
ails modern society. Indeed, calls for a return to
community values and neighborhood governance are being
heard from across the spectrum. (Sampson 2004:106)(Sampson
2004)
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Similarly, concerning development of crime theory and policy in
the modern era, ecological concepts like social capital are
undoubtedly relevant.

However, each attempt to apply social

capital towards a community's crime problems must be weighed
against the traits that define the community, which crimes are
to be targeted through such efforts, and the nuances of how each
crime is influenced by these traits.

Great care must also be

taken not to force notions of social capital into settings where
is does not apply or where advanced specification is required.
As this dissertation revealed, social capital models applicable
in one geography (i.e., the United States) do not necessarily
apply in another (i.e., the United Kingdom).
On the matter of variable clarification, there was some
indication in the data of an underlying segmentation between
organizational participation measures.

Specifically, while

scale reliability in this study ultimately supported aggregating
the seven participation variables into one component, there were
two conceptual areas of participation being measured in the
BSAS: 1.) participation connected to a specific foundation of
belief (e.g., a specific religion, ideology or doctrine), and
2.) organizational participation related to one or more
activities one would be or want to be involved in largely or
entirely unbound by any specific belief.
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Captured under the former would be membership and activity

in organizations political, religious, or charitable in nature
that imply adherence to some core set of ideals that frame the
activity of the organizations’ members and fuel the desire for
those to join and/or stay as members.

Alternatively, the latter

type of participation seems comprised of affiliation with trade
organizations, sports clubs, and the like that seem
comparatively more secular or apolitical in nature.

With a

robust dataset covering both more of the U.K. and additional
measures of organizational activity, a more sophisticated
exploration and possible implementation of participation
measures would be feasible.

Further studies of U.K. crime with

social capital as primary variable would require such efforts.
Considering that an underlying premise of this dissertation
was the notion that social phenomena like crime are rarely
distributed randomly across geographic spaces, it was expected
that crime rates at a community level would reflect some degree
of congruency due to spatial proximity with structurally similar
areas.

Neighboring urban areas often exhibit greater similarity

in crime rates between one another, and the same typically holds
true for rural areas.

Such spatial autocorrelation has been

shown present across vastly different geographic settings – from
violent crimes in urban Chicago neighborhoods (Morenoff,
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Sampson, and Raudenbush 2001) to property crime in residential
communities in Turkey (Erdogan, Yalcin, and Dereli 2013).
Yet, there was surprisingly little support for spatial
autocorrelation in this research.

Only non-violent crime in

rural counties seemed marginally significant (b = .156; p =
.003) when compared with the other structural covariates.
Otherwise, English and Welsh counties illustrated no evidence of
spatial clustering of crime in either urban or rural areas.
Despite this lack of evidence, spatial clustering was important
to explore and should remain a key consideration in future
efforts modeled from this research.
Finally, with only England, and to a more limited extent
Wales, covered in this dissertation, the discourse initiated in
this study needs to expand to Scotland and Northern Ireland, as
well as more countries with suitable data to support such
aggregate-level analysis.

Concurrently, applying the

dissertation methodology to more recent data on crime,
structural demographic activity, and social capital for
communities in such countries would be ideal.

For instance,

presently there are variants of such measures available from
nationally representative studies of social life in Scotland and
Northern Ireland, but these studies vary considerably in how key
variables like social capital and urbanization are measured.
Thus, separate studies should be considered for these countries
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with this dissertation serving as a point of reference.
Scotland, as one example, administers the Scottish Social
Attitudes Survey (SSAS), which has measures similar to the BSAS
but with divergent sets of questions for items representing
social capital.

For Northern Ireland, while there is no

national study that approximates social capital in the manner of
the BSAS or the SSAS, a number of smaller localized studies –
most notably, the doctoral work completed by Dr. Paul Surgenor
through the University of Ulster-Coleraine (Surgenor 2004) –
might be applicable.

All such countries maintain a uniform

database for crime rate and Census-level demographic data, as
well as some layered structure for defining communities by
urbanization level.
!
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APPENDICES
Appendix A: BSAS Variables Measuring “Trust”

How much do you trust British governments of any party to place
the needs of the nation above the interests of their own
political party?
(Answer Choices – 1. Almost never; 2. Only some of the time; 3.
Most of the time; 4. Just about always)
The United Kingdom government at Westminster has responsibility
for England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. How much do
you trust the UK government at Westminster to work in the best
long-term interests of England? Please take your answer from
this card.
(Answer Choices – 1. Almost never; 2. Only some of the time; 3.
Most of the time; 4. Just about always)
Please tick a box to show how much you trust…
a. …governments of any party to spend taxpayers’ money wisely
for the benefit of everyone?
b. …NHS hospitals to spend their money wisely for the benefit
of their patients?
c. …private hospitals to spend their money wisely for the
benefit of their patients?
d. …state schools to spend their money wisely for the benefit
of their pupils?
e. …private fee-paying schools to spend their money wisely
for the benefit of their pupils?
f. …local councils to spend their money wisely for the
benefit of local people?
g. …private pension companies to spend their money wisely for
the benefit of their pensioners?
h. …the state pension scheme to spend its money wisely for
the benefit of pensioners?
i. …police forces to spend their money wisely for the benefit
of local people?
(Answer Choices – 1. Not at all; 2. Not much; 3. Quite a bit; 4.
A great deal)
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Appendix B: BSAS Variables Measuring “Organizational
Participation”
People sometimes belong to different kinds of groups or
associations. The list below contains different types of
groups. For each type of group, please tick a box to say whether
you have taken part in the activities of this group in the past
12 months.
- A political party, club or association
- A trade union or professional association
- A church or other religious organization
- A sports group, hobby or leisure club
- A charitable organization or group
- A neighborhood association or group
- Other associations or groups
(Answer Choices – 1. I do not belong to such a group; 2. I
belong to such a group but never taken part; 3. I have taken
part once or twice; 4. I have taken part more than twice)
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